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INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Ugandan Parliament considered a piece of legislation aimed at
"strengthening the nation's capacity to deal with emerging internal and external
threats to the traditional heterosexual family" that would have made sodomy a
crime punishable by death.' International reporting around the Anti-

Homosexuality Bill of 2009 highlighted the role that American activists played
in building support for the legislation.2 The bill provoked international outcry
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University College of Law. This Article was written while I was serving as Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School and was
completed with the generous support of the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School.
I am grateful for helpful comments from Hope Metcalf, Judith Resnik, and Reuben Teague,
and from the participants in the American Constitution Society Progressive Faculty Workshop
at Yale Law School; the 2016 AALS Program on "Successes and Challenges in the Struggle
for LGBT Rights in Africa"; and the 2016 ISA Program on "Counter-identities and Antipreneurs in the Human Rights/Justice Debate." Finally, thanks to Brian Huddleston for his invaluable help in securing research materials and to the editors of the Stanford Journal of Civil
Rights & Civil Liberties for their editorial assistance.
1. The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, Memorandum § 1.1 (2009).
2. In March 2009, American conservatives, Scott Lively and Don Schmierere, together
with African Stephen Langa, conducted the 'Seminar on Exposing the Homosexual Agenda'
in Kampala, Uganda. Kapya Kaoma, ColonizingAfrican Values: How the U.S. ChristianRight
is Transforming Sexual Politics in Africa, POLITICAL RESEARCH Assocs. 29 (2012),
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and was initially tabled under intense pressure from the donor community.
Nonetheless, the debate over gay rights in Uganda continued "with American
groups on both sides, the Christian right and gay activists, pouring in support and
money." 3 A revised version of the bill was signed into law by President Yoweri

Museveni in February 2014.4 The new legislation eliminated the threat of death,
but still imposed harsh sanctions for homosexual behavior and required life
imprisonment for persons found to have engaged in homosexual acts with

minors, the disabled, and persons with AIDS. 5 The passage of the law, which
was later struck down by the Ugandan Constitutional Court on technical
grounds,6 made Uganda the latest in a series of African countries to enact antigay laws over the last several years.'
This Article situates the Ugandan contest over gay rights within the broader
discussion about state compliance with human rights norms. As many scholars
have noted, human rights advocacy is increasingly a global endeavor.' Part I
examines the growing body of theoretical and empirical work that focuses on the
importance of changing the social and legal environment in which states operate
as a way of changing their human rights behavior. In these accounts, a primary
driver of state compliance is the repeated invocation and interpretation of new
rights norms, until they are internalized and accepted. Formal state recognition
of new rights accelerates the process, mobilizing impacted communities and their
allies and increasing the cost of non-compliance for recalcitrant states.' In an
increasingly integrated world, this process is self-reinforcing over time. The
http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/Colonizing-African-Values.pdf. Lively and Schmierere met with Ugandan parliament members and other
Ugandan politicians and received access to state media to promote their views. Id. On October

14, 2009, shortly after Lively's trip, Ugandan MP David Bahati presented The Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2009 to parliament with the support of many religious leaders. See Tim Walker,
How Uganda Was Seduced by Anti-gay Conservative Evangelicals, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/how-uganda-was-seduced-by-an2014),

tigay-conservative-evangelicals-9193593.html. Under the proposed bill, gay rights activists
could receive up to five years imprisonment, and anyone who failed to report an LGBT person
to the authorities could receive up to six months in prison. Gays and lesbians could be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Jeffrey Gettleman, After U.S. Evangelicals Visit, Uganda
ConsidersDeathfor Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at Al.
3. Jeffrey Gettleman, After U.S. Evangelicals Visit, Uganda Considers Deathfor Gays,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at Al.
4. Alan Cowell, Uganda'sPresident Signs Anti-Gay Bill, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/world/africa/ugandan-president-to-sign-antigay-

law.html.
5. Id.
6. Jeffrey Gettleman, UgandaAnti-Gay Law Struck Down by Court, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug.
1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/world/africa/uganda-anti-gay-law-struckdown-by-court.html.
7. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (listing new legislative and constitutional developments).
8. See infra Part 11.
9. See BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 355 (2009).
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more these rights ideas are normalized, "in the sense of being less contested and
increasingly shared,"lo the more they contribute to the behavioral shift among
other international actors and states. Ultimately, a "norm cascade" develops,
making it increasingly difficult for outliers to continue resisting adoption of the
now widely accepted principle and compelling adherence to the increasingly
dominant legal rule."
As Part II explains, this social account of human rights advocacy has
implications for the geography of domestic advocacy campaigns. If international
consensus around a human rights norm puts pressure on outlier countries to adopt
it, then one powerful way to win acknowledgment of a right domestically is to
win acceptance of that right abroad. Each additional victory--each national or
international acknowledgment of the right-moves the issue closer to the
"tipping point" at which additional national adoptions become more likely. 2
Thus, advocates facing closely contested domestic battles can bolster their efforts
by securing international support for the debated norm. Porous national
boundaries and the efforts of transnational advocacy networks mean that
domestic disputes over rights cannot be hermetically sealed from the broader
international conversation.
Less well-recognized is the possibility of the converse. One strategy for
slowing the development of an "irresistible" norm may be blocking mobilization
towards its acceptance abroad. Increasing awareness of these dynamics is
reshaping transnational advocacy, bringing in a new set of actors who seek to
influence the global dialogue as an essential component of a successful domestic
strategy. Their emergence demonstrates a growing understanding that shifting
the norm internationally is meaningful not just on its own terms, but also in the
way it contributes to the framing of the domestic conversation. Part III describes
the development of a transnational counter-network that borrows many of the
traditional transnational advocacy strategies, but seeks to use them both to
prevent the normalization of equality for gays and lesbians and to undermine the
efficacy of the human rights regime more generally.
Through this lens, the escalation of the debate in Uganda can be viewed as a
cultural "proxy war,"l 3 wherein the opposing sides of the U.S. culture wars fight

10. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, InternationalHuman Rights Norms andDomestic
Change: Conclusions, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE 234, 266 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
I1. Id.
12. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 766 (2006) (citing
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 12-13 (2002)).

13. The war metaphor has been invoked by other authors describing these conflicts, picking up on the language of the "culture wars" in American domestic politics. See KAPYA
KAOMA, AMERICAN CULTURE WARRIORS IN AFRICA: A GUIDE TO THE EXPORTERS OF

HOMOPHOBIA AND SEXISM (2014); Christopher McCrudden, TransnationalCulture Wars, 13
INT'L J. CONST. L. 434 (2015). I use the term "proxy wars" to highlight the power dynamics at
play in these transnational network disputes.
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out the same dispute on new terrain. And as is the case in military conflicts, these
proxy battles can also have serious and damaging consequences for their hosts.
Part IV challenges the generally positive and progressive narrative of
transnational human rights advocacy by examining the social, institutional, and
individual consequences of rival network activity. By drawing on powerful antigay sentiments, autocratic leaders can delegitimize international criticisms of
their rights practice with respect to gays and lesbians and undermine the moral
authority of the international legal system more generally. This final Part
concludes by beginning to highlight some of the implications of counter-network
activity for human rights advocates.
I. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE
International legal theorists have long been preoccupied with the question of
why states comply with international human rights law. As Andrew Moravcsik
explains, human rights law is fundamentally different from most other types of
4
institutionalized international cooperation.' Unlike most kinds of international
law which regulate interactions between states, human rights law provides
external constraints that govern the ways in which a national government

behaves inside its own borders.' 5 Additionally, human rights law enables
individuals to enforce legal norms both against states and beyond their borders
through international courts and other quasi-judicial bodies.16
One view of the question of compliance places states at the center of the
narrative. These theories seek to explain state observance of human rights law as
a product of their interactions with each other." According to realist theorists,
human rights commitments are simply a reflection of hegemonic states' power
and interest." Thus, weaker states will accept human rights when coerced by
more powerful states, while powerful states will accept human rights
9
commitments in order to expand their global influence.' Liberal theory, by
contrast, "emphasizes states' rational pursuit of national interests, interests which

14. Andrew Moravesik, The Origins ofHuman Rights Regimes: DemocraticDelegation
in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 217-18 (2000). See also Susan D. Burgerman, Mobilizing Principles: The Role of TransnationalAdvocates in PromotingHuman Rights Principles, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 905, 906 (1998) ("Regimes of a moral or ethical nature do not conform
to a model of cooperation based on functional contracts among states, such as would explain
cooperation with trade or telecommunications regimes. Moral regimes are not self-enforcing,
are not amenable to strategies based on reciprocity, and offer no intrinsic material incentives
for cooperative behavior.").
15. Moravcsik, supra note 14, at 217.
16. Laurence R. Helfer, OverlegalizingHuman Rights: InternationalRelations Theory
and the Commonwealth CaribbeanBacklash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L.

REv. 1832, 1842 (2002).
17. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 764.
18. Helfer, supra note 16, at 1842.
19. Id.
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reflect the preferences of their component constituencies and the 'domestic and
transnational social context' in which they are embedded." 20 Liberal theorists
argue that states will adopt human rights commitments as a way of "reduc[ing]
the political uncertainty that is an inevitable byproduct of popular sovereignty." 21
For new democracies, sensitive to the possibility of backsliding, adopting
international commitments can be a way of "locking in" democratic rule through
the enforcement of human rights. 22
As many scholars have noted, these accounts fail to explain a significant
amount of observable state behavior, including changes in state behavior that
precede formal adoption of treaty commitments. 23 Ryan Goodman and Derek
Jinks contend that both realist and liberal approaches overemphasize the
processes of persuasion and coercion and underestimate the impact of
acculturation, which they define as "the general process by which actors adopt
the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture." 24 This occurs both
through social and cognitive pressure, either real or imagined. 25 Goodman and
Jinks, and other "constructivist" accounts of transnational behavior focus "on the
role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, stressing in
particular the role of collectively held or 'intersubjective' ideas and
understandings on social life." 26 As Margaret McGuinness has explained, these
theories are helpful in understanding human rights compliance because they
"offer[] a method for analyzing social interactions of states, NGOs, and
individuals with one another and with legal structures that takes into account the
power of norms and ideas," and they provide "a framework for assessing the
ways in which norms, ideas, and actors interact with domestic processes." 27
Both political scientists and legal theorists have contributed to theorizing
how the acculturation process actually works. The most influential account is
Thomas Risse's and Kathryn Sikkink's "spiral model" of human rights change,
in which states move through five stages of behavior from repression to rule20. Id. at 1842-43 (footnote omitted).

21. Id. at 1843.
22. Moravcsik, supra note 14, at 220. See also Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy:
Constitutions, Commitment, and InternationalLaw, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 707, 712
(2006) (finding that new democracies are "more open" to customary international law and
"treaty-making structures that build on the logic of precommitment").
23. See, e.g., McGuinness, supra note 12, at 764-67.
24. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization andInternational Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research
Programin InternationalRelations and ComparativePolitics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 391, 392

(2001).
27. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 765. Over a decade later, "the spiral model remains
the reference for most studies on multi-level human rights politics and compliance with human
rights norms." Anja Jetschke & Andrea Liese, The Power ofHuman Rights a Decade After:
From Euphoria to Contestation, in TtE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 26,41 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013).
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consistent behavior.2 8 The spiral model incorporates the tactics of coercion,
29
persuasion and acculturation at different stages. "An instrumental logic of norm
recognition dominates the early stages of the process as state actors are forced . .
30
to pay homage to human rights norms without truly internalizing them." Norm
compliance deepens in the later stages as domestic policy makers are "convinced
through argumentation that acting in accordance with human rights norms is the
right thing to do." 31

In articulating the spiral model, Risse and Sikkink also began to identify the
different agents of the acculturation process. They suggested that collaboration
between national and international actors pushes the state through each stage of
the spiral. 32 Internally, NGOs develop 'compliance constituencies' to pressure
government officials to adhere to international commitments." 33 Externally,
"transnational advocacy networks" form, consisting of individuals, groups, and
domestic and international government agencies and officials, who "are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of
information and services." 34 By linking up with these networks, domestic
advocates can create "boomerang" patterns of influence on states from above and
below.35
This acculturation phenomenon is self-reinforcing over time. Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink explain that "[t]he more these principled ideas
become norms in the sense of being less contested and increasingly shared, the
28. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The SocializationofInternationalHuman Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS

AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 20 (Thomas Risse et al. eds. 1999). Under this model, the state
engages sequentially in (1) state norm violation; (2) denial of norm legitimacy; (3) tactical
concessions; (4) acknowledgement of the legitimacy of norms; and (5) institutionalization of
norm consistent behavior. Id.
. 29. Id. at 11. These five stages take the state through three phases of socialization, which
include (1) "adaptation and strategic bargaining;" (2) moral consciousness-raising, argumen-

tation, and persuasion; and (3) "institutionalization and habituation." Id Although Risse and
Sikkink did not use the language of acculturation, Jinks and Goodman note that the processes
they describe are represented in the spiral model of compliance. See Goodman & Jinks, supra

note 24, at 637 n.46.
30. Kelly Kollman, Same-Sex Unions: The Globalization of an Idea, 51 INT'L STUD.

Q.

329, 331 (2007).
3 1. Id.
32. Risse & Sikkink, supra note 28, at 33.
33. Helfer, supra note 16, at 1845 (quoting Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and
Consequences ofLegalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 661, 675 (2000)).
34. MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2 (1998).

35. Helfer, supra note 16, at 1846 n.55 (quoting Risse & Sikkink, supra note 28, at 18)
("According to Risse and Sikkink: 'A boomerang pattern of influence exists when domestic
groups in a repressive state bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try
to bring pressure on their states from outside. National opposition groups, NGOs, and social
movements link up with transnational networks and INGOs [international nongovernmental
organizations] who then convince international human rights organizations, donor institutions,
and/or great powers to pressure norm-violating states."').
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more international actors and states sign up to them."36 Ultimately, a tipping
point is reached and a norm cascade develops. A norm cascade occurs "[w]hen
the lowered cost of expressing new norms encourages an ever-increasing number
of people to reject previously popular norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is
adherence to the old norms that produces social disapproval."37 This happens
domestically as the different actors within a state gradually come to accept and
enact a new norm38 but it can also happen regionally, or even globally, as an
increasing number of states internalize, acknowledge, and comply with it. 39 The
more states adopt a particular norm, the more difficult that norm is to resist for
the outliers. 40
The human rights treaty regimes-and their institutions-are important
agents in this process of state acculturation. 41 As Beth Simmons has illustrated,
even governments that don't intend to comply still ratify human rights treaties,
especially when other countries in their region begin to do so, "because they want
to enjoy praise and acceptance and avoid criticism," 42 and because they
underestimate the cost of ratification. While these ratifications are the product of
strategy, not acculturation, the commitments once made can take on a life of their
own. Ratification of the treaty can work to mobilize and focus domestic
constituencies for compliance, by helping to focus and legitimate rights claims, 43
and increase the likelihood that mobilization is successful, by making new
strategies, allies, and fora available to advocates for social change. 44
In particular, treaty ratification opens up a new set of fora for articulating
rights claims. Transnational legal process theory suggests that states come to
obey international law as a result of repeated exposure to and interaction with
other actors in the international legal system.45 The interaction of transnational

36. Risse & Ropp, supra note 10, at 266.
37. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997) (Sunstein offers
as examples, "the attack on apartheid in South Africa, the fall of Communism, the election of
Ronald Reagan, the rise of the feminist movement, and the current assault on affirmative action.").
38. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 766.
39. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
40. See id. at 902 ("[A]t the tipping point ... enough states and enough critical states
endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behavior for the identity called 'state' or some
relevant subset of states (such as a 'liberal' state or a European state).").
41. See Risse & Ropp, supranote 10, at 276-77 (arguing that joining international agreements is an important step towards domestic internationalization of human rights norms).
42. SIMMONS, supra note 9, at 355.
43. Id. at 139.
44. Id.
45. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2646 (1997). See also Ann Marie Clark, The Normative Context ofHuman Rights Criticism:
Treaty Ratification and U.N Mechanisms, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 125 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013) (finding that ratification in conjunction with U.N. targeting was sometimes associated with improvements in
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actors provokes and "forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm
applicable to the situation,"46 which is then invoked by domestic advocates until
it is successfully internalized into the legal and political systems of the targeted
state party.47 Through this "repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and
internationalization," international law begins to "acquire[] its stickiness," and
nation-states eventually "come to 'obey' international law out of perceived selfinterest." 48
This social account of human rights compliance has implications for
advocacy. If international consensus around a human rights norm puts pressure
on outlier countries to adopt it, then a powerful way to create pressure for
acknowledgment of a right domestically is to begin to win acceptance of that
right abroad. Each additional victory--each national or international
acknowledgment of the right-moves the issue closer to the tipping point at
49
which additional national adoptions becomes more likely. In the next Part, I
demonstrate how these dynamics have shaped the advocacy strategies in the
battle over same-sex relationship recognition.
II. TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMPLIANCE

As the previous Part demonstrates, the human rights environment in which
a state operates shapes its choices and behaviors. A large literature documents
cases in which progressive transnational advocacy networks (TANs) have been
able to take advantage of the mechanisms of acculturation to promote domestic

and global change.50 TANs in this story, and in most of the scholarship to date,
have been viewed as positive agents of change, helping to move countries

human rights compliance).
46. Koh, supra note 45, at 2646.
47. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegalProcess, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 204 (1996).
48. Koh, supra note 45, at 2655.
49. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 38; Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 39, at 901;
Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual InternationalLawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 124
(2008) ("[N]orm-affirming events eventually [reach] a tipping point beyond which a preference for rule-compliant behavior predominates."). An extensive literature in law, political science, and sociology now documents the spread of a wide range of policies, from country to
country, within regions, and globally. A few examples include KATERINA LINos, THE
DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: How HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT

LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013); SIMMONS, supranote 9; Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 39; Judith Kelley, Assessing the Complex Evolution ofNorms: The Rise ofInternational Election Monitoring, 62 INT'L ORG. 221 (2008); Elizabeth Herger & Sharon E. Preves,
National Politics as InternationalProcess: The Case ofAnti-Female Genital Cutting Laws,

34 L. & Soc. REV. 703 (2000).
50.

See generally Keck & Sikkink, supra note 34; SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2005); CLIFFORD BOB, THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR NEW

HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: TransnationalCivil Society
Targets Land Mines, 52 INT'L ORG. 613 (1998).
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(usually in the global South) through the spiral model towards human rights
compliance. For activists in the target country, building TANs is viewed as a way
of drawing the "attention of international colleagues to their situation" which
"increas[es] their visibility and leverage" and may provide them with some
protection from government retaliation." Additionally, "material resources,
expertise, and skills training flow into the country . . . furthering their
organizational interests and adding to their political capital." 52 Less attention has
been focused on motivations driving activists from the global North. 53
Finnemore and Sikkink have described these actors as "norm entrepreneurs,"
motivated by "altruism, empathy, [and] ideational commitment."54 These
partnerships may also lend credibility to the work of advocates in the North by
allowing them to argue that they are working with, and not just for, their southern
counterparts.
Early accounts of the spiral model suggested that norm diffusion, while
uneven, was ultimately inevitable." In their early case studies, Risse and Stephen
Ropp concluded that the spiral model functions differently in different places,
and can stall at various stages.56 They attributed the different paths of progress
through the model to the presence of national blocking factors, which are
"domestic forces that prevent the spiral model from moving forward toward the
final stage of rule-consistent behavior." 57 These blocking factors include
"countervailing national norms and value structures which emphasize[]
sovereignty and domestic cohesion more than human rights principles."5 Risse
and Ropp also assumed, however, that blocking factors would only be
temporarily successful in immunizing the state from progressive and rightsenhancing transnational pressure. 9 Subsequent experience demonstrated that
some norms did ultimately fail to diffuse and a new line of scholarship began to
explore the circumstances under which norms failed to take hold. Early "failure"
51. Burgerman, supra note 14, at 910.
52. Id.
53. Following Thomas Kelley, I use this term very generally to refer to the group of
wealthy, Western countries that have historically set the development agenda and controlled
its institution. See Thomas Kelley, Wait! That's Not What We Meant by Civil Society!: Questioning the NGO Orthodoxy in West Africa, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 993, 993 n.2 (2011).
54. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 39, at 898.
55. As Risse and Ropp explained in their 2013 assessment of the spiral model's accuracy, they "did not pay sufficient attention to instances in which states got 'stuck' somewhere
in the process or even experienced backlash." Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction
and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO

COMPLIANCE 3, 11 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013).
56. Risse & Ropp, supra note 10, at 258-66.
57. Helfer, supra note 16, at 1899.
58. Risse & Ropp, supra note 10, at 261.
59. Id. at 262 (Statement of Risse and Ropp: "[W]e assumed ... that arguing and discursive interactions had a 'unidirectional' impact in that human rights advocates would always
have the better arguments and that these arguments would eventually carry the day."). See
Risse & Ropp, supra note 55, at 35.
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studies focused on norm characteristics that cause a norm to diffuse or fail and
the factors within the state that make it more or less receptive to transnational
advocacy. 6 ' More recently, scholars have begun to examine the role that TANs
62
can play in blocking norm adoption in target states.
Over the last two decades, a new international network emerged that
challenges the account of transnational advocacy as exclusively dedicated to
63
enhancing a human rights agenda, and that views its agents as "white knights."
While activists in the new network share some of the human rights advocates'
operating strategies, they aim to disrupt developing transnational human rights
norms and law. Rather than linking transnational and national allies to promote
human rights compliance, this network is focused on helping domestic actors
enhance national blocking factors as a way of building up resistance to shifting

transnational influence. Because its purpose and strategies are oppositional,
designed primarily to deconstruct the international legal regime and the norms it
promotes, I use the term "counter-network" when describing these organizations
64
and their activities.
The emergences of counter-networks make sense under prevailing theories
of international human rights compliance. Given the power of commitment and
60. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 39, at 905-09.
61. See, e.g., Ann E. Towns, Norms and Social Hierarchies: UnderstandingInternational Policy Diffusion "From Below", 66 INT'L ORG. 179, 183 (2012) (describing norm acceptance as a function of the state's social hierarchy).
62. Anders Blok, Contesting Global Norms: Politics ofIdentity in JapanesePro-Whaling Countermobilization,8 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 39 (2008); Clifford Bob, The Global Right
Wing and Theories of TransnationalAdvocacy, 48 THE INT'L SPECTATOR 71 (2013); Phillip
M. Ayoub, With Arms Wide Shut: Threat Perception, Norm Reception, and Mobilized Resistance to LGBTRights, 13 J. HuM. RTS. 337 (2014).
63. SIMMONS, supra note 9, at 356 (noting that a handful of scholars have begun to document the activities of these new networks). See also CLIFFORD BOB, THE GLOBAL RIGHT WING
AND THE CLASH OF WORLD POLITICS 2012) (describing the emergence and activities of what
he calls the "Baptist-burqa" network); KAOMA, supra note 13 (2014) (documenting the activity
of conservative American advocacy organizations in Africa); Louise Chappell, Contesting
Women's Rights: Chartingthe Emergence ofa TransnationalConservative Counter-network,

20 GLOBAL Soc'Y 491, 492 (2006) (providing an early account of this network, describing the
formation of a "transnational conservative patriarchal network" that works to disrupt the international advocacy efforts of women's rights advocates).
64. My account of counter-networks builds upon the literature of domestic countermovements. Tahi Mottl defines a countermovement as "a particular kind of protest movement
which is a response to the social change advocated by an initial movement," or as a "conscious,
collective, organized attempt to resist or to reverse social change." Tahi L. Mottl, The Analysis
of Countermovements, 27 SoC. PROBS. 620, 620 (1980). To sociologist Richard P. Gale, a
countermovement is a "complex, or formal, organization seeking to oppose movement objectives." Richard P. Gale, Social Movements and the State: The Environmental Movement,
Countermovement and Government Agencies, 29 SOC. PERSP. 202, 205 (1986).
In defining this network as a "counter-network," I differ from Bob. I agree with his assessment that these are "powerful policy networks . . . rooted in long-standing, ideologically
opposed blocs," see BOB, supra note 63, at 19-20, but as I will explain, the transnational network activities of these policy networks are primarily reactive, designed to disable and dismantle the mechanisms of traditional TANs.
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acculturation in reshaping state behavior, domestic advocates seeking to resist
international influence should also attempt to block mobilization towards that
norm abroad. In the last two decades, a new network of American conservative
religious and legal organizationS 65 has begun to invest heavily in international
and transnational advocacy. 66 In international and regional institutions, these
actors work to contest and endeavor to destabilize developing soft law norms. At
the national level, they work both in the United States and abroad to build up
resistance to "foreign" human rights norms and to promote the adoption of
explicitly contradictory national and subnational laws. In so doing, the
organizations in this network expose and exploit gaps between formal
acknowledgment of human rights law and deeper commitment to human rights
values.
The next Part introduces and illustrates the operation of this counter-network
through a description of the strategies its actors have adopted to block the legal
reforms advancing equality for gays and lesbians. The counter-network has
adopted the same mechanisms that have been demonstrated to lead to human
rights compliance as a way of trying to contest, slow, and block acceptance of
these norms. I begin with a brief account of the changing landscape of law, both
national and international, governing same-sex behavior and relationships and a
description of the role that transnational advocacy has played in helping to
develop and diffuse a more tolerant, rights-protective regime. I then describe the
development of a transnational counter-network, launched to disrupt the
developing norm cascade and examine the strategies it has employed, both in the
United States and abroad.
III. TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS

Over the last sixty years, there has been a revolution in civil rights
protections for gays and lesbians in countries around the globe. Transnational
advocacy networks have been widely credited with helping to generate the norm
cascade responsible for this rapid rights expansion.
Until the early 1980s, homosexual intercourse was legal in only a handful of
countries, mostly in Western Europe.67 The decriminalization trend accelerated

65. To be clear, while the American members of the counter-network are conservative
legal and religious organizations, they represent only a fraction of the universe of such organizations and institutions. See KAPYA KAOMA, GLOBALIZING THE CULTURE WARs 6-8 (2009),
http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/1 1/africa-full-report.pdf (describing the emergence of counter-network groups in the broader context of Chris-

tian outreach in sub-Saharan Africa).
66. See generally BOB, supra note 63 (describing the emerging litigation strategies of
these groups).
67. This historical account draws from Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation ofSexuality in InternationalHuman Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 797 (2008).
Denmark, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden decriminalized homosexual conduct in the 1930s
and 1940s. Most of greater Europe followed in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 817. England and
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rapidly following two developments in Europe. First, in the early 1980s, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament
adopted measures designed to promote more equal treatment of gays and lesbians

in member states.68 Also in 1981, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
decided Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, decriminalizing sodomy.6 9 The ECtHR
judgment bound all forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe.
"A steady stream of liberalizations followed Dudgeon over the next two
decades,"o as domestic advocates drew on the developing international human
rights norms to frame domestic challenges to laws banning sodomy. Northern
71
Ireland was the first country to decriminalize, "while France repealed its law
making homosexuality an aggravating circumstance in the offense of public
indecency." 72 Cuba and New Zealand decriminalized same-sex intercourse in
73
1984 and 1986, respectively. After the dissolution of the Communist bloc in

the 1990s, almost all of the former Soviet Republics of Eastern Europe, the
74
Baltics, and several in Central Asia adopted decriminalization laws.
The trend continued to expand beyond Europe with the UN Human Rights
75
Committee's 1994 decision in Toonen v. Australia, finding that Australian
prohibitions on homosexual intercourse constituted a violation of the privacy,
equal protection, and non-discrimination provisions of the of the International
76
Following Toonen, Australia
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
79
78
decriminalized in 1994, Albania and Cyprus in 1995," Colombia and Iceland

Wales decriminalized sodomy in 1967, with Canada following in 1969, and Scotland in 1980.
Id. at 817-18.
68. In 1981, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe encouraged member
states to decriminalize homosexual intercourse and ensure equal treatment for gays and lesbians. This was followed in 1984 by the European Parliament's adoption of recommendations
to end workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation. As Fellmeth explains, "These
resolutions established the first Europe-wide public policy of treating some kinds of discrimination based on sexual orientation as inconsistent with state policies respecting personal freedoms and the limits of governmental regulation." Id. at 818.

69. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, ¶ 60 (1981).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Fellmeth, supra note 67, at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., Commc'n No. 488/1992, at 226, U.N.
Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994).
76. Id.
77. See Int'l Gay & Lesbian Ass'n, Euroletter No. 44, Sept. 1996 (Alb. and Cyprus).
78. The Colombian Constitutional Court struck down the law criminalizing adult homosexual sex. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 15, 1996, Sentencia

C-098/96, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
79. See generally Int'l Gay & Lesbian Ass'n, supra note 77 (Iceland).
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in 1996, and Ecuador 0 and China" in 1997. In 1998, the South African
Constitutional Court, referencing Toonen, struck down a similar law on
constitutional grounds.82
In 2000, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly announced a
policy of accepting for membership only states that did not criminalize same-sex
intercourse. Soon thereafter, Romania decriminalized homosexual intercourse on
threat of sanctions from the Council of Europe. Then in 2003, the United States
Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a state law
criminalizing sodomy for seventeen years." In reaching its decision in Lawrence
v. Texas, that criminalizing adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violates
the liberty and privacy interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited approvingly to the Dudgeon decision as
evidence of the practice of Western democracies.8 4
The spread of affirmative protections for gays and lesbians corresponded
with this wave of decriminalization. In the area of relationship recognition, the
norm cascade was particularly pronounced.85 Denmark adopted a registered
partnership model for same-sex couples in 1989, which in subsequent years was
embraced by its Nordic neighbors." "By the late 1990s, the idea of legalizing
same-sex unions moved out of the Nordic region and onto mainland Europe....
In 2000, Germany adopted legislation that was similar to the Nordic registered
partnership laws, but with more limited protections and benefits." 87
The movement towards civil partnerships of various forms was quickly
overtaken by the movement to extend full marriage equality to gays and lesbians.
The Netherlands and Belgium extended marriage rights to same-sex couples in
2001 and 2003, respectively.88 Five short months after the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence, same-sex marriage found its first toehold in the United
80. The Constitutional Court struck down Ecuador's law criminalizing sodomy in Tribunal Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Tribunal of Ecuador], noviembre 27, 1997,
Sentencia No. 111-97-TC, Registro Official, Supp., (No. 203) (Ecuador).
81. The PRC repealed its laws banning "hooliganism" which had been used to harass
homosexuals. Fellmeth, supra note 67, at 821-22 (citing Junling Cui, China'sCrackedCloset,
FOREIGN POL'Y, May 1, 2006, at 90).
82. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6

(CC)(S. Afr.).
83. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (explaining that Justice Kennedy's reference to Dudgeon in Lawrence was necessary to rebut Chief Justice Burger's decision in Bowers. As Kennedy noted, the "sweeping references" in that opinion "to the history
of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account
of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.").
85. See Kollman supra note 30, at 337 (describing the rapid convergence in same-sex
union policies among western democracies).
8 6. Id.
87. Id.
88. Act Opening the Institute of Marriage, Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW][Civil Code] art.

30:1 (Neth.); Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW][Civil Code] art. 143 (BeIg.).
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States. 89 In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that denying gay and lesbian couples the equal right
90
to marry violated the state's constitution. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice

Margaret Marshall cited approvingly to a recent decision by the Court of Appeal
of Ontario, holding that limiting the definition of marriage to a man and a woman
91
In 2005, both Spain and Canada
was unconstitutionally discriminatory.
92
South Africa followed in
legalized marriage for gay and lesbian couples.
same-sex marriage almost
legalized
have
countries
multiple
2009,
2006.93 Since
94
of the United States
Court
Supreme
every year. By June 2015, when the
decided in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states
95
to license and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples, twenty countries
had extended the right to marry to same-sex couples nationwide, while in one,
96
Mexico, the right to marry was available in some states and regions. Another
sizable group of countries, primarily in Europe and South America, offered some
97
set of protections short of marriage.
Transnational networks played a significant role in encouraging the adoption
of these reforms in Europe. 98 The 1970s witnessed an increase of the size and
number of international gay and lesbian organizations, which in the late 1980s
began to draw upon human rights frameworks to make claims for recognition,
protection, and equal treatment. 99 These groups did not try to create new human

89. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
90. Id. at 948 (citing Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
91. Id. at 969.
92. In Canada, the government chose not to appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeal of Ontario and then subsequently passed legislation extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples nationally. See Fellmeth, supra note 67, at 853.
93. Nat'l Coal. For Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
(CC) (S. Afr.).
94. See Freedom to Marry, The Freedom to Marry Internationally, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international. The exception was 2011.
95. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
96. See Freedom to Marry, supra note 94 (including The Netherlands (2001); Belgium
(2003); Spain (2005); Canada (2005); South Africa (2006); Norway (2009); Sweden (2009);
Portugal (2010); Iceland (2010); Argentina (2010); Denmark (2012); Brazil (2013); France
(2013); Uruguay (2013); New Zealand (2013); United Kingdom (2013); Luxembourg (2014);
Finland (2014); Ireland (2015); United States (2015). In Mexico, the right to marry was available in some states and regions).
97. Id. (including Andorra, Austria, Colombia, Croatia, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador,
Germany, Greenland, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Slovenia, and Switzerland).
98. See Kollman, supra note 30, at 337. See also KELLY KOLLMAN, THE SAME-SEX
UNIONs REVOLUTION IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
POLICY CHANGE 2 (2013) (arguing that "the processes of international norm diffusion and so-

cialisation have been an important catalyst of SSU adoption in western democracies."). For an
account of the organizations that worked domestically and internationally to advance the rights
of gays and lesbians, see Jonathan Symons & Dennis Altman, InternationalNorm Polarization: Sexuality as a Subject ofHuman Rights Protection,7 INT'LTHEORY 61, 77 n.10 (2015).
99. Kollman, supra note 30, at 338.
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rights law or norms, but rather drew upon a "well-established body of national
and international law" to argue that "sexual orientation should be recognized as
a category of non-discrimination and ... that relationship rights are human
rights."100
In the mid-1980s, a European network of national and international LGBTI
groups launched a campaign to include sexual orientation in the European human
rights regime. Lobbying by the International Lesbian and Gay Association of
Europe (ILGA-Europe) was successful in pushing the European Parliament to
publish reports condemning sexual orientation discrimination, first in the
workforce and then more broadly. Then, in the 1990s, the European network
gained official consultative status with the Council of Europe and convinced the
European Intergovernmental Conference to include sexual orientation as a
category of nondiscrimination in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force
in 1999.0
In addition to changing the European regulatory framework, ILGA-Europe
was also successful in winning favorable judgments at the ECtHR on behalf of
gays and lesbians. These decisions required the inclusion of homosexuals in the
military, 102 prevented the invocation of sexual orientation in custody battles, 103
and required governments to grant homosexual couples rights equivalent to the
rights of nonmarried, heterosexual couples.1 04
Transnationally networked groups of gay and lesbian activists then worked
to translate these regional norms into national policy, using wins at the
international level to push for domestic reforms.10 Based on interviews with
activists in multiple Western democracies including the United States, Kelly
Kollman concludes that the European human rights regime influenced domestic
policy-making on same-sex unions through three separate processes: national
agenda setting, elite learning, and direct policy harmonization.1 06 Activists
reported using norms developed at the European level to frame sexual orientation
discrimination as a human rights issue domestically; 107 to persuade national
policy elites; 0 8 and to push for binding legal reforms across the region.' 0 9 Due
to the success of these human rights-based arguments, this framing has partially
replaced others such as "national civil rights conceptions" and "framings based

100. Id. at 331.
101. Id. at 340.

102. Perkins v. U.K., App. No. 43208/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
103. Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 327 (1999).
104. Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Kollman, supra note 30, at 341.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
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on gay and lesbian liberation and emancipation."

10

IV. BUILDING A COUNTER-NETWORK
The United States was relatively slow among Western democracies, first to
decriminalize, and then to recognize same-sex relationships, and both
developments were launched by court decisions that cited to foreign law and
practice.'" The potential power of comparative and international law did not go
unnoticed by progressive or conservative advocates. Following Lawrence and

Goodridge, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) held a national
conference in October 2003 to train lawyers in "using international law and
human rights norms to advance justice in U.S. courts or on behalf of U.S.
clients."' 1 2 Two months later, a set of internal memos from Center for

Reproductive Rights (CRR) was leaked to the Catholic Family and Human
Rights Institute (C-FAM), who passed them along to conservative allies in
Congress. The memos articulated a plan to establish a human right to abortion
through work with U.N. agencies and NGOs. "There is a stealth quality to the
113
work," the memo's author noted. "We are achieving incremental recognition
4
of values without a huge amount of scrutiny from the opposition."ll
American conservative organizations also began to recognize that
international law was reshaping domestic law and values, but contrary to the
ACLU and CRR, some viewed this development as a threat."' These concerns
grew when, two years after Lawrence, the Supreme Court decided in Roper v.
Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the exectitiori of children whose
6
crimes were committed before the age of eighteen.1 Again, the Court reversed
7
its own relatively recent precedent," and again Justice Kennedy, writing for the
five-justice majority, looked to international and foreign law to support the
Court's decision."' In response to these decisions, and the broader perception

110. Ronald Holzhacker, "Gay Rights Are Human Rights ": The FramingofNew InterpretationsofInternationalHuman Rights Norms, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n Ann. Meeting Paper at
1 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmT?abstract-id=1902165.
111. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
112. See Rachel Morris, Crusaders in Wingtips, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2006,

http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2006/feature-morrismarapr06.msp
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. Judge Robert Bork wrote: "The problem [with international law] is not merely the
anti-Americanism that grips foreign elites and shapes law; it is also the American intellectual
class, which is largely hostile to the United States and uses alleged international law to attack
the morality of its own government and society." ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE
WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 21 (2003).

116. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
117. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
118. Kennedy explained that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by every
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that international law was evolving in ways that threatened American values, 119
conservative advocates began to adopt their own strategies to address the
influence of international law. In contrast to progressives, however, the primary
focus of their work was to disrupt the pathways through which international law
norms could reshape domestic law.
A. Immunizing the United States from Foreign and International Law
A first set of strategies focused on trying to immunize the United States from
the transformative impact of international human rights law by undermining the
legitimacy of these norms and the institutions through which they develop.
While American conservatives have long had a fraught relationship with the
U.N. human rights regime dating back to the 1950s,120 these concerns were
reinvigorated in the mid-1990s as religious advocacy organizations became
aware of the ways that gay and women's rights advocates were raising questions
of reproductive health and sexuality in U.N. institutions.12 ' Thus, the first line of
country in the world except for United States and Somalia, expressly prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under the age of 18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. He also
noted that "only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders
since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and China," and that each of those countries had since abolished or disavowed the practice.
Id. at 577.
119. As the Alliance for Defense Freedom, a Christian legal organization, wrote:
More and more of America's freedoms will be sacrificed on the ACLU altar of
international law. . . . Left unchecked, the ACLU's war to reshape America in its
own image will almost be complete. Our precious freedoms-of speech, at least
public religious speech, of association, of worship, or living our faith-will have all
but vanished.
ALAN SHEARS & CRAIG OSTEN, THE ACLU vs. AMERICA: EXPOSING THE AGENDA TO REDEFINE
MORAL VALUES 187 (2005).
120. In 1953, Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the
scope of the Treaty Power to match Congress' domestic regulatory authority. 99 CONG. REC.
6777 (1953). The amendment failed, but narrowly, and only because the Eisenhower Administration agreed that the United States would not join international human rights covenants or
conventions. See Louis Henkin, U.S. RatificationofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995).
121. See Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beiing, FIRST THINGS (January 1996),
http://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/01/005-what-happened-at-beijing (describing "the
situation that developed at the UN's 1994 Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo, where an abortion rights initiative led by a hard-edged U.S. delegation pushed all other
population and development issues in the background."); see also, id
The significance of Beijing for human rights is mainly in the nature of a warning.
As the fiftieth anniversary of the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
approaches, the Beijing conference appears to have been a testing ground for certain
ideas and approaches that will be advanced again. We have not seen the last of the
effort to make abortion a fundamental right, or of the attempt to depose heterosexual
marriage and child-raising families from their traditionally preferred positions.
Neither have we seen the last of selective use of rights language to advance an antirights agenda exemplified at Beijing by the emphasis on formal equality at the
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response to developments at the international level was that these advocates, and
their political allies, increased their attacks on the law and institutions of the
United Nations. In January 1994, Senator Jesse Helms' staff learned that the U.N.
Economic and Social Council had granted consultative status to the International
Lesbian and Gay Association, an umbrella group that included the North

American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) as one of its members.
"Describing NAMBLA as an organization 'catering to the twisted desires of
pedophiles,' Helms introduced an amendment to the State Department
authorization bill requiring that the United States cut $119 million in U.N.
funding until the president certified that the United Nations had no connections
1 22
Subsequently, for a period in the late
with groups promoting pedophilia."
1990s, Helms was able to use his influence as chair of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee to block all U.N. funding from the United States
government. 123
Conservative groups also tried to undermine the credibility of U.N. lawmaking processes by characterizing them as an attack on American democracy
and sovereignty. In 1999, Women for Faith & Family (WFF), an international

organization of Catholic women, described U.N. activism by gay rights groups
as nothing more than a "'maneuver' to 'by-pass ratification and avoid ...
confrontations' with states having 'contrary .. . national culture[s] and religious
values."' 124 On the reproductive rights front, "C-FAM termed U.N. treaty bodies
'opaque, complex, and largely unaccountable,' usurping proper policy-making
125
institutions and undermining citizens' ability to control their own societies."
By reframing the processes for making international human rights law

illegitimate, advocates hoped also to delegitimize its content.
Lawrence, Roper, and Goodridgepresented another opportunity to mobilize
popular opposition to foreign and international law. Tapping into longstanding
concerns about American exceptionalism, foreign law citation became a
126
surprisingly hot-button issue in the popular media and in academic circles.
expense of motherhood's special claim to protection, and by the elimination of most
references to religion and parental rights.
122. WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF MODERN
CONSERVATIVISM 413'(2008).

123. See Samantha Singson, US Lawmakers File Bills to Cut Fundingfor Pro-Abortion
UN, LIFENEWS.COM (Jan. 27,2011), http://www.1ifenews.com/2011/01/27/us-lawmakers-filebills-to-cut-funding-for-pro-abortion-un; see also Bob Barr, ProtectingNational Sovereignty
in an Era of InternationalMeddling: An Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.

299, 309 (2002).
124. BOB, supra note 63, at 61.
125. Id.
126. These decisions have prompted a large literature on the normative justifications for
and against the citation of foreign law and comparative practice. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson,
ConstitutionalComparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REv. 109,
118 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses ofInternationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (2004); Austin L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme
Court's Use ofForeignLaw, 2 U. ILL. L. REv. 637, 647 (2007); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
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Following Lawrence, each nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court was questioned
as to his or her position on the uses of foreign and international law as well as
the threat it poses to U.S. sovereignty.1 2 7 The issue gained more attention as a
series of statutes and constitutional amendments were proposed, both at the
federal level and in the states,1 28 that purported to block the use of foreign and
international law in the opinions of U.S. courts, or that made the citation of
foreign law by American judges a punishable offense.1 29 In 2010, seventy percent
of voters supported the "Save our State" amendment to the Oklahoma
Constitution, which directed the state's judges not to "look to the legal precepts
of other nations or cultures" and not to consider "international or Sharia Law" in
their decision-making.' 30 After the amendment provision was challenged and
struck down on First Amendment grounds, the state legislature enacted a new
statute that no longer mentioned Sharia but banned reliance on foreign law unless
it provides "the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under
the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions."'
The negative reception that greeted the Oklahoma amendment in federal
court did little to discourage other states from considering international and
An American Amendment, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 479-82 (2009); Mark Tushnet,
The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1309 (1999).
127. See Nathan Koppel, To Cite or Not to Cite?: Senators, Kagan, Spar Over Foreign
Law, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 30, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/30/to-cite-ornot-to-cite-senators-kagan-spar-over-foreign-law; Sen. Coburn QuestionsJudge Sotomayor at
Supreme Court Nomination Hearings, WASH. PosT (July 15, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071501414.html; Transcript of U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme
Court, WASH. PosT (Jan. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-

cle/2006/01/1 1/AR2006011101148.html.
128. See JudicialReliance on ForeignLaw: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Reliance on foreign law exacerbates judicial
activism and empowers judges to impose their own policy preferences from the bench.").
129. See generally Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma & Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State Anti-TransnationalLaw Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1 (2011); Faiza
Patel et al., ForeignLaw Bans: Legal Uncertaintiesand PracticalProblems, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (May 16, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/foreign-law-bans-legaluncertainties-and-practical-problems.
130. State Question Number 77/Legislative Referendum Number 355, Enr. H.J.R. No.
1056, Amending Oklahoma Constitution Art. 7, §1 (May 25 2010); see also Davis & Kalb,
supra note 129 (describing the public debate and litigation around the Oklahoma constitutional
amendment).

131. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

§ 20B (West 2014),

Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or decision shall
violate the public policy of this state and be void and unenforceable if the court,
arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency bases its rulings or decisions in the
matter at issue in whole or in part on foreign law that would not grant the parties

affected by the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and
privileges granted under the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions, including
but not limited to due process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right
of privacy or marriage as specifically defined by the Constitution of this state.
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foreign law bans. By 2013, variations on the Oklahoma model had been
13 2
Different
introduced in more than 100 other bills in thirty-one other states.

versions prohibit consideration of Sharia law, religious laws, foreign religious
codes, legal precepts of other nations or culture, and international law. While
133
and their language makes their
only a handful of these bills have been adopted,
restrictions easy to evade, their popularity sends a clear message to jurists
(particularly those who are elected in the states) about the potential costs of
referencing these sources in their decision-making.
B. Blocking the Transnational Diffusion of New International Norms
In parallel with these efforts to protect the U.S. from international legal
influence, American lawyers began the project of helping to reshape national law
in other countries in order to block the advancement of more tolerant norms
governing sexual identity and to undermine the relationships between these
countries and international human rights activists and institutions.
The countries of East Africa have been a particularly promising target for

this activity. A 2006 survey from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
found that conservative views on sexuality were all but universal in parts of
Eastern Africa; ninety-nine percent of Nigerians and Kenyans disapprove of
homosexuality.1 34 While most countries in Anglophone East Africa already had
laws prohibiting "carnal knowledge against the order of nature" left over from
132. E.g., S.B. 62, 2011 S., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska
2011); S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 45, 151st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H. Conc. Res. 44, 60th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); H.B. 575,
84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); S.J. Res. 16, 117 Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2011); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 386, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012); H.B.
785, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 811, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); H.B. 4769, 96th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 2281, 87th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.B. 301,
126th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.J. Res. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.

2011); Leg. B. 647, 102nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011); H.B. 1422, 162nd Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2011); Assemb. B. 919, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012); S.J. Res. 18, 50th
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011); H.B. 640, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess (N.C. 2011); H.B. 2029,
195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); S.B. 444, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2011); H.J. Res. 1004, 86th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 3768, 169th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010); H.J. Res. 57, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011); H.B.
296, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); H.B. 631, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012); H.B. 3220, 80th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2011); H.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); See also Faiza
Patel et al., Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical Problems 1 (Center for
American Progress, May 2013).
133. As of January 2015, five states had adopted some form of foreign law ban. See
Judith Resnik, Constructing the Foreign: American Law's Relationship to Non-Domestic
Sources, in COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 437 (Andenas & Fairgrieve eds., 2015) citing
ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 12-3101 to -3103 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (West 2012); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 20-15-101 to -106 (West 2012)).
134. Spirit and Power-A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5,
2006), http://www.pewforum.org/2006/10/05/spirit-and-power.
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British colonialism, beginning in 2006, several countries proposed. or adopted
new laws explicitly banning same-sex sexual contact and imposing severe
sanctions (including death) on people convicted of violating the prohibitions.1 35
In the last few years, Burundi, the Gambia, Malawi, and Nigeria have all passed
anti-gay laws. 13 6 Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution banning gay marriage.1 37
American activists were involved in developing and promoting these laws.
For example, while the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill was under debate, the
American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ)13 8 opened offices in Kenya and
Zimbabwe, which provided "a base for work in both countries and nearby
Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan." 39 According to a report by the
progressive think tank Political Research Associates, the African offices were
opened with the goal of "lobbying [African parliaments] to take Christians'
views into consideration as they draft legislation and policies."'4 0 "In Zimbabwe,
the Centre joined forces with the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ),
an indigenous organization, to promote constitutional language affirming that
Zimbabwe is a Christian nation and ensuring that homosexuality remained
illegal."' 4' The impact of American conservative politics has been visible in
many of the proposed reforms, which also banned same-sex marriage and
adoption of children by same-sex couples, issues that were not even on the
agenda of indigenous gay rights activists.1 42
These political and legal interventions by American organizations have often
135. Kaoma, supra note 2, at 6, 8.
136. See Gambina Leader Approves Anti-Gay Law, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/2 1/gambian-leader-approves-anti-gay-law;
Stephen Wandera, Gay Rights Defenders Get Shs 5.b Donation, DAILY MONITOR (Feb. 7,
2013), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Gay-rights-defenders-get-Shs5b-donation/-

/688334/1687022/-/cOa44pz/-/index.html.
137. Nathalie Baptiste & Foreign Policy in Focus, It's Not Just Uganda: Behind the
Christian Right's Onslaught in Africa, NATION (April 4, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/179191/its-not-just-uganda-behind-christian-rights-onslaught-africa#.
138. Kaoma, supra note 2, at 10.
139. Id.
140. Id. As ACLJ explains:
In Zimbabwe, we partnered with the Christian churches to ensure that their
collective voice is represented in the drafting of a new constitution. . . . [T]he
partnerships in both Zimbabwe and Kenya arose because African Christians sought
our help. The ACLJ is sensitive to Zimbabwe's history and culture, which is why
our Zimbabwean affiliates have always set their own agenda.
Jordan Sekulow, Assisting Africans in Supporting Pro-Life and Pro-Family Values, ACLJ,
http://aclj.org/united-nations/assisting-africans-supporting-pro-life-pro-family-values
(last

visited Jan. 17, 2017).
141. Baptiste, supra note 137.
142. Kaoma, supra note 2, at 9. Interestingly, progressive activism may also have led to
similar outcomes. There are a handful of African nations in which homosexuality is criminalized, but sexual orientation discrimination is also prohibited. See Samantha Spooner, Forgive
It. Africa Is Not Anti-Gay; The Continent Is Just Hopelessly Confused, MAIL & GUARDIAN
AFRICA (Aug. 23, 2014), http://mgafrica.com/article/2014-08-22-africa-is-not-anti-gay-thecontinent-is-plain-confused.
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been framed in terms of protecting African communities from the international
gay rights movement. The "belief that western LGBT activists recruit young
43
Sylvia Tamale, a
people into homosexuality is common across Africa."'
professor at Makerere University in Uganda, reported that when she publicly
supported the rights of gays and lesbians, both her friends and critics assumed
that she "was involved in a campaign that was driven from the West."" She
explained that Ugandans "seemed to think that there was a network of
homosexual organizations 'out there' with an explicit agenda to 'recruit' young
African men and women into their 'decadent, perverted habits,"' and "that
money was going to pour in from gay and lesbian organizations in Western
45
Europe and North America" to support her work.1
American activists have been able to capitalize upon and reinforce these
existing concerns about homosexuality and its relationship to these countries'

colonial legacy. A spokesman for Human Life International (HLI), a Catholic
pro-life organization, explained that his organization feels "that it is important
for us to be [in Africa] because the assault on the natural African pro-life and
pro-family values is coming from the United States, so we feel obligated to help
them understand the threat and respond to it based on their own values and
culture."l46 He went on to argue that HLI speaks "to the deep and natural values
of our brothers and sisters in Africa, and help[s] them resist the encroachment of
very powerful western interests who think that there are too many children in

Africa."' 47 Similarly, the ACLJ has argued (in response to criticism of its
activities) that "even a cursory review of Kenyan and African cultures
demonstiates it is western governments, not the ACLJ, that seeks to create a
48
culture war in Africa."
C. Disrupting the Development of International Legal Norms
As these efforts were ongoing to protect national law (both in the U.S. and
abroad) from the pressure of international legal developments, some advocates
began to argue that attacking the legitimacy of international law was insufficient

to disrupt its norm-shaping effects. Brigham Young University law professor
143. KAOMA, supra note 63, at 15.

144. Sylvia Tamale, Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality Discourses in Uganda, 2
42 (Feb. 2003), http://agi.ac.za/sites/agi.ac.za/files/fa_2_standpoint_3.pdf.
145. Id. Stephen Langa, director of the Uganda-based Family Life Network, stated at an
anti-gay conference that "young people ... were given a lot of money by gay activists in
Uganda to recruit their colleagues into lesbianism." IGLHRC Update: More on the Anti-Gay
Seminar in Uganda, OUTRIGHT ACTION INT'L (Mar. 5, 2009), http://iglhrc.org/content/iglhrcupdate-more-anti-gay-seminar-uganda.
146. David Smith, US EvangelicalChristiansAccused ofPromoting Homophobiain Africa, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/24/evangelicalchristians-homophobia-africa.
FEMINIST AFRICA

147. Id.

148. Sekulow, supra note 140.
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Richard G. Wilkins argued that "norms [are] being used to . .. deconstruct
longstanding concepts of marriage and family."l49 Wilkins "therefore advise[d]
his own network 'to avoid negative outcomes and promote positive ones.""s
Thus around the same time period in the mid-1990s, a new set of tactics
began to emerge that focused on contesting the development of new norms at the
international level. Conservative advocacy organizations began to actively
engage with international and regional institutions and courts, adopting (and coopting) the language of human rights.'' In 1997, the ACLJ, a prominent
conservative public interest law firm,' 52 opened the European Center for Law
and Justice in Strasbourg expressly for the purpose of engaging with the United
Nations and the Council of Europe, and for intervening in cases of the European
Court of Human Rights that could impact the shape of family law, reproductive
rights, and religious freedom in the United States. That same.year, former Reagan
appointee to the National Commission on Children Allan Carlson founded the
World Congress of Families, "an international network of pro-family
organizations, scholars, leaders, and people of goodwill ... that seek to restore
the natural family as the fundamental social unit and the 'seedbed' of civil
society,"' 53 and C-FAM was formed "to defend life and family at international
institutions and to publicize the debate."' 54 These organizations worked to
develop a coalition of religious conservative nations that would create a firewall
in the U.N. against the acceptance of new resolutions, reports, or treaty
interpretations that advance gay and lesbian rights. Austin Ruse, the leader of CFAM, explained the strategy: "the future potential lies in the religious NGOs'
ability to build a permanent conservative block of U.N. member states dedicated

149. Richard G. Wilkins, International Law, Social Change and the Family (undated
manuscript) (on file with author).
150. BOB, supra note 63, at 62 (quoting Id.).
151. As Doris Buss and Didi Herman document, this new strategy was an awkward adjustment for many of these organizations, which continued to view the U.N. with deep hostility. See DORIS Buss & DIDI HERMAN, GLOBALIZING FAMILY VALUES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 52-53 (2003). As these authors explain, implicit in all variants of
Christian Right U.N. activism is a concern that the international realm-whether as a fundamentally anti-Christian space or an emerging power largely under the sway of antifamily
forces-poses a threat to the domestic state both at "home" in the United States and in the
"vulnerable third world." This threat may be envisioned in different ways-as a move to world
governance or as the secularization of all societies, domestic and international-but it shares
a single feature: an attack on the power of individual nations to define their own religious and
cultural practices. Id. at 53-54.
152. The ACLJ was founded in the United States in 1990 by Pat Robertson to be a counterweight to the ACLU. Kaoma, supranote 2, at 9. The ACLJ "positions itself as the legal arm
of conservatives in the U.S. culture wars; the group defends 'the sanctity of human life, and
the two-parent, marriage-bound family."' Id.
153. Benjamin Parker, The World Congress ofFamilies Responds to the Southern Poverty Law Center, WKLY. STANDARD (July 27, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/theworld-congress-of-families-responds-to-the-southem-poverty-law-center/article/99844 1.
154. Mission Statement, CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM. RTs., https://c-fam.org/about-us/mission-statement (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
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to conservative values."155
These organizing efforts resulted in some unusual allegiances-as ADF
Senior Legal Counsel Bradley Abramson explained, "At the United Nations, we
find our allies where we can get them. We don't support what Islamic countries
are doing to Christians, but at the same time, they support us on the marriage
issue, they support us on the life issue."l 56 At the 2000 Beijing + 5 Conference,
WFF reached out to form alliances with "non-Western" countries, whose official
views on abortion and sexual orientation more closely mapped to their own."
In some of those countries, WFF explained, certain "tribal excesses," such as
female genital mutilation, honor killings, and dowry deaths provided Western
158
groups with "emotional clubs to cow the delegates into accepting gay rights."
While rejecting those "excesses," WFF argued that "solving" these "familial
injustices" should not "be sufficient reason to dismantle traditional families
worldwide." 5 9 According to WFF, their organizing strategy was successful. The
allied nations prevented the working sessions or "PrepComs" from settling on a
160
draft document to be considered by the General Assembly.
This conservative voting bloc has been successful on other occasions in
preventing new soft law on abortion and gay rights from developing. For
example, "[i]n December 2009, the U.N. General Assembly voted to delete a
reference to gender identity and sexual orientation as categories of non1 61
The successful coalition pushing for the
discrimination from a resolution."
alteration was made up of countries from Africa, the Islamic world, and the
nations of the Caribbean.' 62 In April 2015, for the first time in history, the United
Nations Commission on Population and Development concluded without an
outcome document. A bloc of conservative states, primarily African and Arab
member states, "call[ed] for the complete deletion of abortion, 'comprehensive

155.

NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEV. COOPERATION, LOBBYING FOR FAITH AND FAMILY:

A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS NGOS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 10 (2013), http://www.norad.no/glob-

alassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/lobbying-for-faith-and-family.pdf.
156. Alex Seitz-Wald, Evangelicals are Winning the Gay MarriageFight-inAfrica and
Russia, NAT'L J. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/gay-washington/evangelicals-are-winning-the-gay-marriage-fight-in-africa-and-russia-20140123.
157. Mary Jo Anderson, WFF, Beiing + 5 Report, WOMEN FOR FAITH & FAM. VOICES
(2000), http://archive.wf-f.org/Sum2K-Anderson.html. I draw this account from BOB, supra
note 63 at 45.
158. BOB, supra note 63, at 45-46.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEV. COOPERATION, supra note 155, at 10. Austin Ruse,
head of C-FAM believes that these alliances have been effective in defeating international
declarations to support reproductive and gay rights. "On sexual identity, our coalition is really
huge," he says. Seitz-Wald, supra note 156.
162.

NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEV. COOPERATION, supra note 155, at 10.
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sexuality education,' and population control language."i" 3 When this demand
was not met, the African Group rejected the text in its entirety and the
Commission concluded unsuccessfully. "In an unprecedented move, the island
state of Nauru spoke from the floor to report that the United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA) had inappropriately pressured its government to change its
stance on life and family and requested that this be put on record."' 64
At first, the network's efforts were primarily reactive, focused on preventing
consensus from forming around new gender and sexuality norms. However, as
advocates became more adept at operating on the international stage, the strategy
evolved. Rather than just resisting new international law, American
organizations and their international partners in civil society and govermment
began to develop and advocate for alternatives.
These efforts took two forms. First, advocates began to seek out and create
opportunities to "introduce a 'pro-family,' Christianized vision of the social
order into international politics for the purpose of engaging with, and influence,
global change."' 65 As Clifford Bob explains it, "[t]he goal [became] to stuff the
international system with soft law contradicting and counteracting that of the gay
network .. . [to make it] hard to identify which of numerous contrary statements
constitutes the norm . . ." and "difficult to shame reluctant states into joining a
purported but nonexistent consensus." 66 For example, the 2004 Doha
International Conference for the Family had all the characteristics of a typical
U.N. convening except that its "ideological polarity .. . was switched."' 67 Its
working committee of NGOs included representatives of conservative groups
like Brigham Young University's World Family Policy Center, the Family
Research Council, and C-Fam. The resulting declaration, "quoting the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, reaffirmed the 'right of men and women' (only)
to marry and the family 'as the natural and fundamental group unit of
society.""6 " In 2008, the U.N. Family Rights Caucus was founded "to ensure
that the family is protected in all United Nations policies and agreements."' 69
Then in 2015, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution which stated that
"the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to

163. Pro-Life and Family Member States Reject Outcome Document at U.N. Commission on Population and Development, ADF INT'L, (Apr. 21, 2015), https://adfintemational.org/detailspages/press-release-details/pro-life-and-family-member-states-reject-outcome-document-at-un-commission-on-population-and-development.
164. Id.
165. Buss & Herman, supra note 151, at 136.
166. BOB, supra note 63, at 62.
167. "It was endorsed by a U.N. resolution, advertised by a worldwide call for participation, preceded by regional preparatory meetings, and attended by hundreds of state and nongovernmental delegates." Id. at 55.
168. Id.
169. U.N. FAMILY RIGHTS CAUcus, ABOUT Us http://www.unfamilyrightscaucus.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
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protection by the society and state."
In addition to working to generate more palatable "pro family" international
norms, conservative activists also began to develop international law arguments
to justify rights-violating behavior. Over the last decade, conservative advocates
have made a consistent, and somewhat successful, push for UN recognition of
the importance of "traditional values." Their hope is to formalize respect for
traditional values within international law, leaving open the space for each state
to determine whether observing particular human rights norms is consistent with
17
its national culture and tradition. ' Critics argue that "traditional values"
72
advocacy poses a fundamental challenge to the idea of universal human rights,1
and can be used to justify discriminatory behavior, particularly with respect to
73
Nonetheless, the Human
women and members of the LGBTQ community.'

Rights Council adopted three resolutions between 2009 and 2012 affirming the

res,

170. The UN and Family Values: A New Global Force is FightingLiberal Social MoTHE ECONOMIST: ERASMUS (July 11, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/eras-

mus/2015/07/un-and-family-values.
171. As explained by Metropolitan Kirill, former head of the Russian Orthodox Church's
Department for External Church Relations, in a 2008 speech before the U.N. Human Rights
Committee:
[T]he development of the human rights institution has been increasingly affected in
a monopolistic way by a limited range of ideas concerning the human nature, which
are not shared by most people in the world. More often than not, international
organizations involved in human rights tend to draw their conclusions from the
opinions of a narrow circle of experts, functionaries, or noisy but well-organized
minorities. Many national states appear to have fallen under the influence of these
fellows, too, thus losing their ability to communicate the authentic attitude to values
to characteristic of their own nation.
Vebjorn L. Horsfjord, Negotiating Traditional Values: The Russian Orthodox Church at the
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in RELIGION, STATE AND THE UNITED
NATIONS: VALUE POLITICS 62, 62 (Anne Stensvold ed., 2017).
172. See, e.g., Rosa Freedman, United Nations Under Pressureto Protect 'Traditional
Families' Over Individual Rights, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 17, 2014), http://theconversation.com/united-nations-under-pressure-to-protect-traditional-families-over-individualrights-31757; Graeme Reid, 'TraditionalValues' Codefor Human Rights Abuse?, CNN.coM:
http://global2012),
17,
(Oct.
SQUARE
PUBLIC
GLOBAL
publicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/17/traditional-values-code-for-human-rights-abuse; Cai
Wilkinson, Putting Traditional Values into Practice:Russia's Anti-Gay Law, 138 RUSSIAN
ANALYTIC DIG. 5, 6 (2013).
173. See Graeme Reid, The Trouble with Tradition: When "Values" Trample Over
Rights, HRW, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/africa (last visited
Sept. 7, 2016). And in fact, traditional values are already being used to justify discrimination
against LGBT persons in Russia. In its submission to the UNHRC regarding the "traditional
values" resolution, the Russian LGBT Network explained that: "Traditional values" in Russia
are not just discourse. They are part of political and social reality. The use of traditional values
rhetoric has served to justify a crackdown on dissent and the imposition of severe restrictions
on the LGBT community." Cai Wilkinson, Putting "Traditional Values" Into Practice: The
Rise and Contestation ofAnti-PropagandaLaws in Russia, 13 J. OF HUM. RTs 363, 364-365
(quoting Russian LGBT Network, "Best Practice"of Using the Concept of "TraditionalVal-

ues" in Russia, U.N. Doc A/HRC/24/22 (Feb. 28 2012)).

2017]

HUMAN RIGHTS PROXY WARS

79

importance of traditional values.' 74 The 2012 resolution stated that "a better
understanding and appreciation of traditional values shared by all humanity and
embodied in universal human rights instruments contribute to promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide." 75 Each of these
resolutions has been presented by Russia, and supported by the conservative bloc
of states from Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 76 Notably, the same
network of American conservatives has been active in Russia, both lobbying for
anti-gay laws domestically and praising Russian leadership on traditional values
advocacy at the U.N. 177
In sum, while conservative advocates have engaged more actively with
international law and institutions, their strategy still differs from traditional
TANs in that the network's continued (although not exclusive) focus is on
weakening the universality of international human rights law. Nationally (in the
U.S. and abroad), network agents advocate for laws and policies that attempt to
immunize domestic law from international influence. Internationally, they work
to slow the development of new norms preventing discrimination against gays
and lesbians, and to generate alternative, or "counter-norms" that would excuse
rights-violating behavior. The next Part examines the impact that this counternetwork has had on rights diffusion, in the United States and in other sites of
network activity.

174. Stefano Gennarini, U.N. Human Rights Council Affirms Traditional Values,
CFAM (Oct. 4, 2012), https://c-fam.org/friday fax/un-human-rights-council-affirms-traditional-values/. See also Wilkinson, supra note 172, 363-64 (describing the three resolutions).
175. Stefano Gennarini, supra note 174.

176. Human Rights Council Res. 12/21, U.N. Doc. A/65/53, at 43-44 (Oct. 2, 2009);
Human Rights Council Res. 16/3, U.N. Doc. A/66/53 at 35-36 (Mar. 24, 2011), Human Rights
Council Res. 21/3 U.N. Doc. A/67/53 Add. 1 at 18-19 (Sept. 27, 2012). See also NORWEGIAN
AGENCY, supra note 155, at 10.
177. Kapya Kaoma reports that in 2007, Scott Lively visited Russia to discuss the "homosexual political movement" and to encourage the "criminaliz[ation of] the public advocacy
of homosexuality." Kapya Kaoma, Editorial, How Anti-Gay Christians Evangelize Hate
Abroad, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kaomauganda-gays-american-ministers-201403 23-story.html. In 2013, Austin Ruse, of C-FAM, supra note 154, told the AP that he was planning to travel to Russia that summer to "let them
know they do in fact have support among American NGOs ... on social issues." See David
Crary, Some U.S. Conservatives Laud Russia's Anti-Gay Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1,
2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/some-us-conservatives-laud-russias-anti-gay-bill. He explained "You admire some of the things they're doing in Russia against [homosexual] propaganda," which "would be impossible to do" in the United States. Id The World Congress of
Families (WCF), see Parker, supra note 153, has also been very active in Russia, "host[ing] at
least five major gatherings in Russia since 2010." Hannah Levintova, Did Anti-Gay Evangelicals Skirt U.S. Sanctions on Russia, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 8, 2014). Managing director of
WCF, Larry Jacobs, explained that WCF is "convinced that Russia does and should play a
very significant role in defense of the family and moral values worldwide. Russia has become
a leader of promoting these values in the international arena." See MASHA GESSEN, THE MAN
WITHOUT A FACE: THE UNLIKELY RISE OF VLADIMIR PUTIN 311 (2013).
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V. COUNTER-NETWORKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROXY WARS

The previous parts have articulated the idea of a transnational counternetwork-and have illustrated the operations of one that was built to reshape the
global legal regime governing the treatment of lesbian and gay communities.
Now I turn to examine the impact of this counter-network and to ask how, if at
all, its existence should reshape current understandings of the mechanisms of
human rights compliance.
A. Assessing the Impact of Counter-Network Activity on Norm Diffusion
As the previous part illustrates, the transnational counter-network of
conservative American leaders, partnering with elites, religious leaders, and
African civil society organizations, has been able to create or reinforce internal
blocking factors to help slow the adoption or diffusion of human rights norms in
East Africa. But a key purpose of this international and transnational advocacy
has been to reshape the conversation about rights norms in the United States.
Scott Lively, one of the American evangelicals who visited Uganda immediately
prior to the introduction of the so-called "Kill the Gays" bill, was explicit about
this strategy, which involves "going to other countries in the world that are still
culturally conservative to warn them about how the Left has advanced its agenda
78
in the U.S., Canada, and Europe-and to help put the barriers back in place"l
and thereby to develop a firewall among friendly nations as a way of slowing or

stopping the diffusion of equality norms globally.1 79 The "goal is to build a
consensus of moral countries to actually roll back the leftist agenda" in the
80
United States.'

178. Seitz-Wald, supra note 156.
179. Notably, there are some early indications that the blockade may not hold. The Kenyan Supreme Court recently held that the government's decision not to recognize the National
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission as an NGO, simply because it included the words
"gay" and "lesbian," was unconstitutional. See Thom Senzee, Score Onefor LGBT Rights in
Africa, THE ADVOCATE (May 5, 2015), http://www.advocate.com/world/2015/05/05/scoreone-lgbt-rights-africa. In November 2015, the Botswanan High Court issued a similar ruling,
holding that refusing to register the organization "Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals of Botswana"
violated the applicants' rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and to
equal protection of the law. See Anneke Meerkotter & Graeme Reid, Africa Rulings Move
LGBT Rights Forward,JURIST (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/05/africarulings-move-lgbt-rights-forward. In May 2015, the Zambian High Court upheld the acquittal
of Paul Kasonkomona, who spoke in favor of rights recognition for gays and lesbians on a
private television station. He had been arrested and charged with "soliciting for immoral purposes." The Court held that Kasonkomona was engaged in protected expression under the
Zambian Constitution. Id.
Moreover, in other regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, there has been some movement towards decriminalization. Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mozambique have all recently
decriminalized homosexuality. 76 Countries Where Homosexuality is Illegal, ERASING 76,
(Updated Aug. 12, 2016), http://76crimes.com/76-countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal.
180. Seitz-Wald, supra note 156.
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As Christopher McCrudden has recently documented, American members
of the counter-network are increasingly present in U.S. Supreme Court advocacy,
representing the comparative and international law arguments that they have
helped to shape through their international and transnational advocacy.'"' For
example, in Ayotte v. PlannedParenthoodofNorthern New England,'82 counsel
for amicus curiae, the University Faculty for Life in support of petitioner was
Richard Wilkins.1 83 Its brief argued that:
Unlike other questions, for which a strong consensus exists, resort to
international law regarding abortion provides little guidance for this
Court. To the extent such guidance does exist, it supports the right of
parents to be involved in the care and treatment of their daughters, and
thus supports the petitioner in this case.' 84
Similarly, in Hollingsworthv. Perry,'8 5 a challenge to the legality of a voterenacted ballot initiative that amended the California Constitution to prohibit
same-sex marriage, a brief by international jurists and academics, submitted by
Judge Georg Ross and by the Marriage Law Foundation, emphasized the
significance of the ECtHR's jurisprudence in Schalk andKopfv. Austria that the
European Convention does not require Council of Europe member nations to
permit same-sex marriage absent "a European consensus toward legal
recognition of same-sex couples."' 86 These same advocates have been
instrumental in preventing a consensus in state practice from developing across
Europe. In the Czech Republic, the ACLJ helped defeat legislation legalizing
same-sex marriage.' In Romania, the ACLJ affiliate ECLJ has supported a
constitutional provision defining marriage as being between a man and a
woman.' ECU has also lobbied in the Council of Europe against expanding

181. See McCrudden, supra note 13.
182. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
183. Wilkins was one of the most influential conservative strategists in the UN and an
architect of the Doha Declaration, affirming international support for "traditional" family
structures. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; Pam Squyres, Pro-Life International,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 21, 2000), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/1 1/pro-life-international. See also Richard G. Wilkins, The Principlesofthe Proclamation:Ten Years ofHelp,
44 BYU STUD. Q. 5, 8 (2005).
184. Brief for University Faculty for Life as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1144),
2005 WL 1912326, at *1.
185. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
186. Amicus Curiae Brief of International Jurists and Academics in Support of Petitioner
Hollingsworth and Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and
Supporting Reversal at 27, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12307) (quoting Schalk, 53 EHRR 20 (2011)).
187. Mariah Blake, U.S. Evangelicals Aim to Influence EuropeanLaw, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0417/pOls03-woeu.html.
188. Romania: Debate on Human Trafficking and Family Values, EUR. CENTRE FOR L.

& JUST. (May 19, 2014), http://eclj.org/romania-debate-on-human-trafficking-and-family-values. For an account of network conflicts in Romania, see BOB, supra note 63, at 96-106.
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18 9
legal protections based on sexual orientation.
Thus, the fruits of the counter-network's activity are beginning to surface in
American legal discourse. Through their work in international and regional
courts, and in the courts and legislatures of other countries, American advocates
have helped to create legal evidence to support their claims about global practice
related to sexuality rights. Two decades later, however, this activity does not
appear to have been successful in preventing U.S. acceptance of same-sex
relationships. The Court's decision in Obergefell capped off a tremendous and
rapid transformation both in the law and in public opinion. On Election Day in
2004, the year after the Lawrence decision, voters in eleven states adopted
190
in many states with
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage,
191
By 2008, thirty states had a constitutional
more than 70% of voters in favor.
marriage ban. 192 Less than a decade later, both the law and public opinion had
changed dramatically. In a poll conducted in February 2015, four months before
Obergefell, 63% of Americans said that gays and lesbians have a constitutional
right to marry. 19 3 This support extended to every region of the country, with 57%
of Southerners, 67% of Americans in the West, 70% in the Northeast, and 60%
1 94
in the Midwest supporting marriage.
The U.S. experience is consistent with that in other liberal democracies.
Over the last decade, fifteen countries in Europe, North, and Latin America have
legalized same-sex marriage, while many others have taken steps towards samesex marriage recognition. In May 2015, Ireland became the first country to allow
same-sex marriage by popular referendum-with 62% of voters expressing

support. 195 The vehement opposition of conservative religious nations in Africa,
Eastern Europe, and the Middle East does not appear to be have been successful
in preventing the norm from diffusing among regional and cultural allies.

189. See The PACE's Draft Resolution, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://eclj.org/COE/eclj-the-paces-draft-resolution-on-discrimination-on-the-basis-of-sexualorientation-and-gender-identity-discriminates-and-threatens-fundamental-rights-of-otherpeople.
190. Julie L. Davis, State Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
1079, 1087 (2006).
Results,
Election
191. CNN.com,
(Arkansas-74%;
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/
Georgia-76%; Kentucky-75%; Mississippi-86%; North Dakota-73%; Oklahoma76%;
192. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06marriage.html.
193. Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Obama'sApproval Rating StagnantDespiteEconomy, CNN
POL. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/politics/poll-obama-approval-ratingeconomy/index.html.
2015
at
19,
Feb.
12-15,
POLL
INTERNATIONAL
194. CNN/ORC
http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/2015/images/02/19/rel2f.obama.and.domestic.issues.pdf.
195. See Henry McDonald, IrelandBecomes First Country to Legalise Gay Marriageby
http://www.theguard2015),
23,
(May
GUARDIAN
THE
Popular Vote,
ian.com/world/2015/may/23/gay-marriage-ireland-yes-vote.
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The failure of the counter-network to block acceptance of same-sex
relationship recognition in the United States specifically, and among Western
democracies more generally, suggests that a counter-network's success may turn
on its ability to mobilize the national communities that are salient to its target.
The briefing in Obergefell suggests the complicated politics of counter-network
activity. The international law scholars' brief, penned by Harold Hongju Koh
and colleagues and filed on behalf of petitioners in favor of a constitutionallyprotected right to marry, draws heavily on the examples of Western European
and South American states.1 96 In a reference, perhaps to the developments in
Eastern Africa and Russia described here, amici noted that:
Not all legislative and judicial decisions from the world community concerning the recognition of same-sex relationships provide models that
this Court should follow. Decisions from nations that do not share our
constitutional values for individual liberty, equality, and dignity may
still be useful in that they provide "anti-models," i.e., decisions from
which this Court should consciously depart. 197
The brief then referenced the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, in which
the majority observed that the United States' policy of executing juveniles placed
the country in ignominious company.1 9
In response, the brief of international law scholars supporting the
respondents, concluded that "[t]here is simply no 'emerging global consensus'
for same sex marriage" noting that "any form of same sex marriage has only been
adopted by 17 of the 193 member states of the United Nations."l 99 By shifting
the denominator2 00 to include all countries of the United Nations, the brief paints
a very different picture of the reach and depth of the marriage equality norm. The
brief goes on to say, that "[m]ost of the remaining countries are not the 'antimodels' that Koh amici suggest, but are constitutional democracies that share our
values of individual liberty." 201 However, the brief then does not list any of these

196. See Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Harold Hongju Koh et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos.
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), availableat http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/up-

loads/2015/03/14-556-fcle.pdf.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Id.
199. See Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries and
the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent,

Obergefell v. Hodges, at 3, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-575),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/14-55614-56214-5711457454bsaclnternationalAndComparativeLawExperts.pdf.
200. See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the DenominatorProblem, 119
HARV. L. REv. 148 (2005) (describing the way in which the Court has relied on practices in
foreign jurisdictions in order to expand the "denominator" in Eighth Amendment cases to support the argument that a practice is cruel and unusual).
201. See Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries and
the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respond-

ent, Obergefell v. Hodges, at 3, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-
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allegedly analogous nations by name. Instead, the brief proceeds to focus on
analyzing the jurisprudence of roughly the same subset of countries as the Koh
amici.
The dynamics of the briefing in this case suggest a realization by American
advocates on both sides of the conversation that not all models are likely to carry

equal weight with the justices. The popularity of the "Kill the Gays" bill in
203
for example, are
Uganda 202 or the Russian anti-homosexual propaganda law,
public.
American
or
the
unlikely to be persuasive, either to American legal elites
In fact, invocation of these deeply homophobic laws might be more likely to push
the citizenry in liberal democracies toward drawing constitutional distinctions
than to persuade them that the question of the lawfulness of sexual orientation
discrimination is still open.
This is not to say that the counter-network is having no impact on the
diffusion of rights to relationship recognition in liberal democracies. Andrew
Guzman and Katarina Linos have argued that the relatively limited decisions of
the ECtHR in Schalk and Gas and Dubois v. France have been influential in
slowing the legalization of marriage for same-sex couples in the United
204
Kingdom, a country in which there has been widespread support for gay rights.
205
which occurs
They suggest that this is an example of human rights backsliding,
levels of
high
or
maintain
adopt
to
efforts
"undermine[s]
law
rights
human
when
the
above
protections
offer
otherwise
would
that
protection in countries
206
of
level
in
the
reductions
to
point
they
Similarly,
international norm."
to
the
and
protection accorded to criminal defendants in the United Kingdom,
parental leave time offered in Sweden, as cases of backsliding in response to
7
lower European standards. 20 I am not suggesting that these latter examples
represent the results of counter-network activity; rather I raise them in order to
demonstrate that to the extent that a counter-network is able to reshape
expectations in a relevant political community (as opposed to simply in the
global one), its activities may be more effective.

B. Counter-Network Activity and Human Rights Compliance

While American conservative advocates have thus far failed to block the

575), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/14-55614-56214-5711457454bsaclnternationalAndComparativeLawExperts.pdf.
202. See Baptiste, supra note 137.
203. Adam Federman, How US EvangelicalsFueled the Rise ofRussia's 'Pro-Family'
Right, THE NATION, Jan. 27, 2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/how-us-evangelicals-

fueled-rise-russias-pro-family-right.
204.
REv. 603,
205.
206.

Andrew T. Guzman & Katarina Linos, Human Rights Backsliding, 102 CALIF. L.
618 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 605.

207. Id. at 606, 614-23.
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diffusion of relationship recognition in the United States, they have arguably
been quite successful in undermining perceptions of and engagement with the
international human rights regime both domestically and abroad. 208
Although polling results are mixed, in the United States, distrust of the
"foreign" continues to grow. Over the last decade, American public opinion of
the United Nations has, at least by some accounts, hit all-time lows.209 According
to polling by the Opportunity Agenda, a human rights advocacy organization,
Americans are also deeply ambivalent about the human rights treaty regime, with
46% agreeing that "the U.S. should not sign and follow human rights treaties
because 'it would violate our sovereignty and our government's right to protect
our interests."'2 1 0 Two-thirds believe that "people in the U.S. should not try to
interpret and enforce human rights for people living in other countries," and more
than half agree that "because of different culture and values, it is impossible to
have rights that apply to everyone in the world."' 211 One of the two major
political parties in the United States has made rejection of international law and
its institutions a major focus of its agenda. The 2016 Republican Platform rejects
a number of human rights treaties "whose long-range implications are ominous

208. Notably, however, Americans "are more likely to favor the adoption of a policy
when told that other countries have already adopted it, [and] especially when they hear that
the United Nations (U.N.) recommends this policy for all countries." Katerina Linos, THE
DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: How HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT
LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013), 176-77. Perhaps counterintuitively, Republicans

are more positively influenced by a U.N. endorsement than Democrats, id. at 48, 51, at least
when the endorsement is for a domestic social policy program, id. at 51. Linos posits that the
availability of successful foreign models in peer countries helps to alleviate concerns about
new domestic programs because foreign governments and international organizations can provide useful, impartial information. Id. This may explain why foreign examples continue to
have persuasive weight in American policy discussions, even as Americans express doubts
about foreign and international law more generally.
209. See Scott Clement, The UnitedNations: Do Americans Still Hate It?, WASH. POST
(Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/behind-the-numbers/post/theunited-nations-do-americans-still-hate-it/2012/04/26/gIQANXPjjTblog.html.

210.

THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE U.S.: OPINION RESEARCH WITH

JOURNALISTS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 6 (Aug. 2007), https://opportunityagenda.org/pdfs/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20REPORT.PDF.
211. Id. at 6. By contrast, in a 2008 WorldPublicOpinion poll, seventy percent of U.S.
respondents agreed that the U.N. should "actively promote human rights in member states."
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PUBLIC OPINION ON GLOBAL ISSUES 1 (Nov. 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/publicopinion. In a 2004 survey, three-quarters of Americans agreed, "If
a country seriously violates human rights, the United Nations should intervene," compared to
18% who said that "Even if human rights are seriously violated, the country's sovereignty
must be respected, and that the United Nations should not intervene." Id. One possible explanation for the divergence between these two polls is that the Opportunity Agenda framed its
questions more explicitly in the context of considering the role of international human rights
law and its institutions in the United States, whereas the other polls asked more general questions about the role of the UN in the world. It's plausible that Americans may react more
negatively to human rights and international law when the focus is on the United States rather
than the rest of the world.
ADVOCATES,
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or unclear"212 including "the U.N. Convention on Women's Rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities, and the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, as well as various
declarations from the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development" and
2 13
The GOP Platform also questions the financing
the "Law of the Sea Treaty."
of the U.N., attacks the legitimacy of the Human Rights Council and the U.N.

Population Fund, 214 and highlights the problem of judicial activism "which
includes reliance on foreign law or unratified treaties . . . ."215 And despite their
limited practical impact and doubtful legality, new states continue to consider
216
and adopt foreign law bans.
Another possible indicator of the counter-network's influence has been the
Supreme Court's failure to cite foreign and international law in several of its
recent high profile decisions. Despite international and comparative briefing on

both sides of Hollingsworth, Hobby Lobby, and Obergefell, no member of the
217
McCrudden has argued that this silence
Court mentioned these arguments.
represents a success for the conservative advocates and organizations. By
submitting their own briefs defining the state of international law, he contends,
these advocates create ambiguity about the existence of a clear and relevant

human rights norm. 21 8 Additionally, it is possible that the public backlash
following cases like Roper and Lawrence has raised the stakes for judicial
citation and caused the justices to reevaluate the weight they give to foreign law
and practice, or at least to refrain from referencing it in their decisions.
More significant, however, has been the impact of the counter-network's

activities in partner countries, both in terms of mobilizing and legalizing hostility
towards gays and lesbians, and also in undermining the international legal regime
and its institutions and agents. Part of the success of American efforts to codify
anti-gay norms into national law is undoubtedly due to the resonance of anti-gay

212.

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

2016 51 (2016),

https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-

ben_1468872234.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 10. In January 2017, a handful of Republican lawmakers proposed the American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2017, which would "terminate" the United States' membership in the United Nations and its institutions. Natasha Bertrand, A Bill Has Already Been
Introduced in Congress to Remove the US from the United Nations, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 23,
http://www.businessinsider.com/american-sovereignty-restoration-act-us-withdraw2017),
un-2017-1.
216. See, e.g., Jordan Schachtel, South CarolinaHouse Passes Bill Excluding Sharia
Law from State Courts, BREITBART (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-govern(reporting
ment/2016/01/28/exclusive-south-carolina-house-passes-bill-banning-sharia-law

South Carolina's adoption of exactly such a ban).
217. See Christopher McCrudden, TransnationalCulture Wars, 13 INT'L J. CONsT. L.

434,460 (2015) (highlighting the absence of foreign and international law in the Hollingsworth
and Hobby Lobby cases).
218. Id.
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values in much of East Africa; however, this agenda has additional benefits for
elites seeking to consolidate power.
Risse and Ropp point out that national blocking factors may sometimes be
generated or enhanced by national leaders as a way to resist external pressures
toward norm compliance more generally.2 19 "To the extent that the domestic or
international audiences find these arguments persuasive, governments [may]
temporarily be able to fight off transnational processes." 220 Leaders in East
Africa who have openly embraced the partnership of American conservative
advocates on gay rights include Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Yahya Jammeh of
Gambia, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, 22 1 all of whom have been the subject
of domestic and international criticism for their failure to abide by international
law.222 By drawing on powerful anti-gay sentiments in their countries, these
leaders delegitimize international criticisms of their treatment of gays and
lesbians and undermine the moral authority of Western critics in other areas of
governance. 223 Indeed, in some cases, they have been able to gain public
international support from American conservatives in exchange for their
continued commitment to anti-gay laws. 224
219. See Risse & Ropp, supra note 1.0, at 262 (blocking factors can be employed "by
norm-violating governments in a public discourse with their critics during the phases of denial
or tactical concessions").
220.

Id.

221. See OUTRIGHT ACTION INT'L, NAMIBIA: NUJOMA ATTACKS HOMOSExuALS (Jan. 1,

1997), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/88.html;
Raymond Baguma, Museveni Lauds Ugandans on Anti-Gay Stand, NEW VISION (July 14, 2008),
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new vision/news/ 1185501/museveni-lauds-ugandans-anti-gaystand; Homosexual and Hated in Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 1998),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossingcontinents/143169.stm.
222. See Megan Duzor & Blessing Zulu, U.S. Sanctions Against Zimbabwe to Stay in
Place, VOA (May 29, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sanctions-zimbabwe/2798784.html (reporting on the extension of sanctions against Mugabe following reports
of election tampering and human rights abuses); Ishaan Tharoor, Gambia'sPresidentThreatens to Slit the Throats of Gay Men, WASH. POST (May 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/12/gambias-president-threatens-to-slit-thethroats-of-gay-men/ (reporting cuts in foreign aid to Gambia in response to its human rights
record); Profile: Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4124584.stm (last updated Feb. 25, 2006) (describing international criticism of Museveni's treatment of the political opposition in Uganda).
223. After signing the 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act, Museveni responded to criticism
by urging Western governments to "[r]espect African societies and their values." Elizabeth
Landau, Zain Verjee, & Antonia Mortensen, Uganda President:Homosexuals Are 'Disgusting', CNN (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/24/world/africa/uganda-homosexuality-interview. "If you don't agree, just keep quiet," he said in an interview with CNN. "Let
us manage our society, then we will see. If we are wrong, we shall find out by ourselves, just
the way we don't interfere with yours." Id. See also Tendai Dube, Robert Mugabe Defends
Mine OwnershipPlan, Lampoons 'Brutal'West, THE STUFF, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/africa/67659896/robert-mugabe-defends-mine-ownership-plan-lampoons-brutal-west (last updated Apr. 9, 2015) ("Mugabe attacked the 'reckless and brutal approach of the West' towards
Africa and the Middle East ... and describe[ed] the United Nations as a 'circus."').
224. Baptiste, supra note 137. See also PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY FOUND. GLOBALIZING
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More generally, repressive leaders can draw on anti-gay sentiments to build
popular support for national regimes-and to punish as disloyal or even
treasonous, indigenous activists who try to draw on the support of transnational
actors to promote domestic legal change. During the same period that the AntiHomosexuality Act was being debated, the Ugandan Parliament (with the strong
support of President Musveni) adopted the Public Order Management Act, which

gave the police broad authority to permit or disallow any "public meeting,"
which was defined as any gathering of three or more people in a public location
where the "'failure of any government, political party or political organization"'
is discussed. 225 The Public Order Management Act has reportedly been used to
inhibit the activities of the political opposition and of human rights
organizations. 226 In November 2015, a bill was adopted that would broaden the
government's ability to regulate the activities of Ugandan non-governmental
organizations and would prohibit these groups from engaging in any activity that
227
is "contrary to the dignity of the people of Uganda."
Similarly, the passage of anti-gay legislation in regions throughout Russia
corresponded with the adoption of a law requiring any NGO that receives foreign
228
This law has been used to harass not
funds to register as a "foreign agent."
229
but also Russia's only independent monitoring
only gay and lesbian NGOs,
organization and polling agency, as well as human rights organizations including
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that have been critical of
Putin. 230 By linking the "gay agenda" to international organizations,
governments have been able to build domestic support for repressive laws that,
if passed, work to disable the mechanisms of transnational advocacy more
generally.
Thus, while the counter-network may have been unsuccessful in stopping
HoMOPHOBIA: HOW THE AMERICAN RIGHT SUPPORTS AND DEFENDS RUSSIA'S ANTI-GAY

CRACKDOWN 3 (2014), http://www.pfaw.org/rww-in-focus/globalizing-homophobia-howamerican-right-supports-and-defends-russia-s-anti-gay-crackd (listing statements by American conservative leaders in support of Russia's government).
225. Maria Burnett, Dispatches:A New Law Undermines Rights of Ugandans, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/06/dispatches-new-lawundermines-rights-ugandans.
226.

See AMNESTY INT'L, UGANDA: RULE BY LAW: DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION AND

LEGITIMIZED

ABUSES

IN

UGANDA,

7-8

(2014),

https://www.amnesty.org/en/docu-

AMNESTY INT'L, "WE COME IN AND DISPERSE THEM:"
ments/AFR59/006/2014/en;
VIoLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY BY THE UGANDAN POLICE, 6-7 (2015),

https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/ugandareport.pdf
227. Parliament Passes Controversial NGO Bill on Eve of Pope's Arrival, DAILY
MONITOR (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Parliament-passes-con-

troversial-NGO-bill/688334-2974692-8n2col/index.html.
228. Sean Guillory, Repression and Gay Rights in Russia, THE NATION (Sept. 26,2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/176368/repression-and-gay-rights-russia.
229. Id.
230. See Russia: Voters' Group First Victim of 'ForeignAgent' Law, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 3, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/russia-voters-group-first-victim-foreign-agent-law.
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the diffusion of the marriage equality norm, its activities are helping to build
resistance to the international human rights regime in ways that may have wideranging impacts. While Risse and Ropp's early account conceptualized blocking
factors as countervailing national norms, 23 1 more recent scholarship has
highlighted the development of international counter-norms that governments
can invoke to justify behavior that violates human rights.232 For example,
Kathryn Sikkink highlights the importance of counter-norms in helping the
United States resist domestic and international criticism to rejects its reliance on
torture as part of the "War on Terror." In her account, the Bush Administration
was able to resist external pressures because "the anti-terrorism counter-norm
was accepted by large parts of the US population and by some US allies abroad,
lessening both domestic and international pressures for change." 233
The network described here is helping to develop international counternorms based on traditional values and sovereignty that challenge not just
individual human rights norms, but the legitimacy of the broader human rights
project. 234 While these arguments began at the national level as a way of building
up domestic resistance to international pressures, 235 increasingly the network has
begun to seek international recognition of these counter-norms as a way of
shifting the global balance of power. For example, because of its leadership in
the "traditional values" advocacy at the United Nations Human Rights Council,
Russia has emerged as a state leader of the anti-gay transnational counternetwork. 236 By expressing its support for traditional values on the international
stage, and attacking the human rights regime as illegitimate, Vladamir Putin has
been able to consolidate support for his regime domestically 237 and position
Russia as a leader of religious, conservative nations internationally. 23 8 Sexuality
231. See supra notes 55-56, 58-59 and accompanying text.
232. See Anja Jetschke & Andrea Liese, The Power of Human Rights A Decade After:
From Euphoria to Contestation, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 26, 35-41 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013).
233. Katheryn Sikkink, The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?,
in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 145, 146

(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013).
234. Ten years earlier, China adopted a similar strategy after Tianamen Square, challenging the universality and legitimacy of the international human rights regime by arguing
for an alternative "Chinese human rights" based on so-called "Asian values." See Katrin
Kinzelbach, Resisting the Power of Human Rights: The People'sRepublic of China, in THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 164, 166-67

(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013).
235. See supra Parts IV.B. & IV.C.
236. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
237. The anti-homoproganda laws enjoy broad public support-68 percent as ofNovember 2013 and have helped Putin earn the loyalty and support of the Orthodox church. See id.
(citing Maksim Glikin, Repressivny zakony ne vyzyvayut u rossiyan vozmusheniya (Nov. 23,

2013).

238. As this Article goes to press, there are some early indications that President Trump
may adopt a similar strategy, lending the United States' authority and resources to the counternetwork's activities. See Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Donald Trump and the UN.:
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rights have become another area of contestation and mobilization as Russia
2 39
If
jockeys with the European Union for regional and global influence.
successful, these counter-norms could destabilize the international human rights
regime by challenging the core premise of the universality of basic human rights.
Finally, and most urgently, the counter-network's activism has also

dramatically and devastatingly impacted the daily lives of gays and lesbians in
these countries. In Uganda, gays and lesbians reported that prior to the
introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill of 2009, conditions had improved
marginally and that they had been allowed to "hold news conferences and
24 0
The months following the introduction of
publicly advocate for their rights."

the bill saw a sharp increase in violence against LGBTI people.

241

A local tabloid

paper published the photos and contact information of a number of gays and
24 2
In 2011, David Kato, a prominent
lesbians under the banner "Hang Them!"
243
Following the
and visible gay rights activist was brutally beaten to death.

introduction and passage of the revised legislation in 2014, the tabloid again
published the names of "Uganda's Top Homos," leading immediately to the
244
"[O]ther prominent LGBT
murder of another person believed to be gay.
245
By
activists [went] into hiding to avoid becoming victims themselves."

Signs of Clashing Views on Many Issues, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016) (highlighting policy
positions that Trump has taken that conflict with international human rights law); Harriet Alexander, Donald Trump andthe UnitedNations: A Fight Waiting to Happen? THE TELEGRAPH

(Jan. 19, 2017) (describing Trump's criticisms of the U.N.).
239. See Katja Kahlina & Dusica Ristivojevic, LGBT Rights, Standards of Civilization
and the Multipolar World Order, E-INTr'L RELATIONS (Sept. 10, 2015) http://www.e("In
ir.info/2015/09/10/lgbt-rights-standards-of-civilisation-and-the-multipolar-world-order
the larger context of on-going destabilizations of the post Cold-War world order and the increasing multipolarity of geopolitical power, the Russian case should be regarded not (only)
as a resistance to gay conditionality, but as a strategy of the global re-position of a rising power
in the emerging multi-polar world."); Erik Voeten, Why Russia Tried to Curb Same-sex Partner Rights at the U.N. (And Why It Lost), WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/25/why-russia-tried-to-curb-same-sex-partnerrights-at-the-u-n-and-why-it-lost/ (speculating that Russia's anti-gay activity at the U.N. is a
way of building allegiances with other countries that feel threatened by criticism of their

LGBT rights policies and "challenging more liberal ideas about human rights embedded in
international institutions . . . .").
240. Jeffrey Gettleman, Americans' Role Seen in UgandaAnti-Gay Push, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/africa/04uganda.html?_r-0.
241. Owen Bowcott, Uganda Anti-Gay Law Led to Tenfold Rise in Attacks on LBGTI
People, Report Says, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/12/uganda-anti-gay-law-rise-attacks.
242. Xan Rice, Ugandan Paper Calls for Gay People to Be Hanged, THE GUARDIAN,
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/21/ugandan-paper-gay-people-

hanged.
243. Jeffrey Gettleman, Ugandan Who Spoke Up for Gays Is Beaten to Death, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/africa/28uganda.html.
244. Sunnivie Brydum, LGBT UgandansAttacked, Killed as Tabloid Lists 'Top 200 Homos', THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/world/2014/02/25/lgbtugandans-attacked-tabloid-lists-top-200-homos.
245. Id.
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generating a very public debate about the status of gays and lesbians in Uganda
(often by stoking fears of HIV/AIDS and pedophilia), network activities forced
this vulnerable group into an unwanted spotlight with horrific consequences.
A similar phenomenon has occurred in Russia. Russia's adoption of anti-gay
laws coincided with its appearance on the international stage as a supporter of
traditional values. 246 Although the anti-homoproganda laws began to emerge in
Russia in 2006, with the passage of a local law fining persons who engaged in
public acts aimed at the propaganda of homosexuality, it was not until 2012three years after the first U.N. resolution on traditional values, that the passage
of anti-gay laws gained traction nationally. 247 The federal law banning
propaganda of homosexuality to minors was passed in 2013.248 Gay rights
activists in Russia report that these laws have encouraged "anti-gay abuse,
discrimination and violence." 249
VI. LESSONS FOR TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY

As these examples illustrate, rival network activity can disrupt the status quo
in very destructive ways, producing a backlash that widens the space between
state practice and rights norms with severe impacts on broader society. In the
U.S. domestic context, scholars have long been preoccupied with movementcounter-movement interaction and its impact on the pace and direction of social
change.250 Cognizant of these dynamics, advocates have been strategic and

246. Compare supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (describing Russia's anti-gay
activity in the U.N., starting in 2009), with Wilkinson, supra note 173, at 366 (dating the earliest subnational anti-gay laws to Ryzan Oblast in 2006 and Arkhangelsk and Kostroma Oblasts in 2011). Russia had previously decriminalized homosexual behavior in 1993 as part of
the wave of liberalizations that occurred in Europe at that time. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Russia Revokes Law Punishing Gay Sex, LA TIMES (May 29, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-29/news/mn-41287_1_human-rights.
247. See Wilkinson, supra note 173, at 366.
248. Id. (citing Federal Law of the Russian Republic).
249. Russia's LGBT Victimised By 'Gay Propaganda'Law, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 14,
2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/09/russia-igbt-victimised-gay-propaganda-law-150914082614488.html. See also Nora Fitzgerald and Vladimir Ruvinsky, The
Fear of Being Gay in Russia, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/russia-putin-lgbt-violence- 116202
250. Some influential contributions to this discussion include: 23 ROUTING THE
OPPOSITION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY (David S. Meyer et al.

eds. 2005); Kenneth T. Andrews, Movement-Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence
ofNew Institutions: The Case of "White Flight" Schools in Mississippi, 80 Soc. FORCES 911
(2002); Jocelyn Elise Crowley, Fathers' Rights Groups, Domestic Violence and Political
Countermobilization, 88 Soc. FORCES 723 (2009); Marc Dixon, Movements, Countermovements, andPolicy Adoption: The Case ofRight-to- WorkActivism, 87 Soc. FORCES 473 (2008);
Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory Countermovement Brought Same Sex Marriageinto the PublicArena, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 449 (2014);
Clarence Y. H. Lo, Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the U.S., 8 ANN. REV.
Soc. 107 (1982).
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cautious about when and how to push for particular gains, whether with the

public, in the legislatures, or in the courts. To date, the scholarship on
transnational advocacy and human rights compliance has paid insufficient
251
or to the
attention to the negative consequences of failed norm diffusion

possibility of backlash. 252 Failures have "been conceptualized mostly as ...
ineffectiveness producing the internalization of the advocated norm in the target
253
The Ugandan
state," or "the maintenance of the status quo in the target state."

example highlights the possibility that failed norm diffusion can be dangerous.
Making claims based on international rights commitments that have only thin
popular support may work to undermine both the commitments and the
may help to shore up domestic support for law-breaking
claimants 254-and
regimes.
This possibility is particularly pronounced when actors in the counternetwork are actively working to highlight the gaps between law on the books and
law on the ground. The country's international legal commitments are refrained
as foreign (and even colonial) and domestic rights proponents are characterized
as treasonous or corrupt. As a result, when treaty commitments are raised in
national discourse and courts, rather than domesticating and institutionalizing the
rights norm (as transnational legal process theory would predict), they can
actually work to make the rights commitments and the broader legal system seem
alien and illegitimate. 255 In Uganda, the competing claims by the network and
counter-network about which set of laws represents "true" Ugandan values have
exposed the tenuous legitimacy of all different forms of law in a country where
democracy and constitutionalism are both weak.
Given the heightened stakes and risks posed by counter-network activity,
rights advocates (both inside and outside government) should proceed with
caution when considering strategies for advancing rights, cognizant of the ways

251. Fernando Nufiez-Mietz & Lucrecia Garcia lommi, Can TransnationalNorm Advocacy UndermineInternalization2 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
252. Kathryn Sikkink, The United States and Torture: Does the SpiralModel Work?, in
THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 145, 145

(2013) (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013) (noting that the original spiral model failed to take
into account the possibility "that a country which had already ratified and implemented human
rights treaties on a core human rights norm could nevertheless have a profound backlash and
reversal of these commitments, even when they are deeply embedded in both international and
domestic law").
253. Fernando Nufiez-Mietz & Lucrecia Garcia Iommi, supra note 251, at 2.
254. Lawrence Helfer has warned that the "overlegalization" of human rights may result
in national backlash when the meaning of a state's treaty commitments evolve over time in
ways that create wide disparities between the state's obligations under international law and

its domestic policy preferences. See Laurence R. Helfer, supra note 16, at 1891-94.
255. Following the Constitutional Court's 2014 decision striking down the Anti-Homosexuality Act, one of the pastors who supported the legislation speculated in the press about
"whether the ruling is in any way related to the president's travel to America." Elias Biryabarema, Uganda's ConstitutionalCourt Overturns Anti-Gay Law, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 1,
2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-01-ugandas-highest-court-overturns-anti-gay-law.
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that rival network interactions can reshape domestic political conditions in
unexpected and destructive ways. For example, certain moves, like the public
withdrawal of aid to countries that adopt anti-gay laws-or refuse to endorse
sexuality rights-may have the unintended impact of worsening the backlash,
generating popular resentment against the human rights regime and
consolidating support for national leaders who resist international pressure.2 56
Even if these kinds of financial and social penalties are successfully in coercing
a short term shift to norm-compliant behavior by government, they may
undermine real internalization and acceptance of the norm.2 57 In other words,
compliance created by external pressures (as conceptualized in the spiral model)
may actually undermine norm internationalization, at least in cases where
domestic support for the rights norms is limited.
This critique of the spiral model is related to, but different from, the broad
skepticism expressed by a range of commentators that the human rights regime
"is little more than a front for Western imperialist values." 258 Simmons has
demonstrated persuasively that in practice, treaty commitments have the ability
to mobilize impacted groups and individuals "to formulate and demand their own
liberation." 259 Her evidence suggests that international law works against
existing power structures "in sometimes surprising ways." 260 Katerina Linos has
also challenged the notion that international influence is inconsistent with
democracy by illustrating how electoral politics can lead to the diffusion and
256. For example, following the introduction and adoption of anti-gay law in several
African nations, the United States and European Union moved to condition development aid
on the legal protection of gays and lesbians. Prior to the negotiations over the revision of the
Cotonou Agreement, the European Parliament insisted that "actions conducted under the terms
of the various partnerships be pursued without any discrimination on grounds of gender ...
sexual orientation or against people living with HIV/AIDS." EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM B70693/2010). These demands were rejected by the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states who
argued that the EU should "refrain from any attempts to impose its values" on homosexuality.
Declaration of the 21st Session of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly on the Peaceful Co-Existence of Religions and the Importance Given to the Phenomenon ofHomosexuality in the ACPEU Partnership (Sept. 28, 2010). David Cameron's threat to withdraw bilateral aid was condemned by African leaders "as paternalistic and an affront ... to national identity and culture."
Symons & Altman, supra note 98, at 80.
257. As Goodman and Jinks explain, "[s]ocial and symbolic rewards are often perceived
by actors as controlling and thus degrade their intrinsic motivation in some circumstances."
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Social Mechanisms to Promote InternationalHuman Rights:
Complementary or Contradictory?, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 103, 113 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013). They point to studies
of apartheid South Africa, where the sanctions programs had the unintended consequence of
building national unity and domestic resistance. Id. (quoting HERIBERT ADAM & KOGILA
MOODLEY, THE OPENING OF THE APARTHEID MIND 57 (1993) (finding that "[t]he expected
pressure by business on government as a result of sanctions has not occurred. In fact, sanctions
brought business and government together in the patriotic cause of circumventing foreign interference.")).
258. Simmons, supra note 9, at 6.
259. Id at 7.
260. Id.
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adoption of foreign models even in wealthy Western democracies that are
relatively impervious to international pressures.261
The concern presented here is not that the human rights regime is inherently
imperialist or anti-democratic, but rather that rival network activity can threaten
the entrepreneurship of activists in target countries, undermining both their
ownership of their own rights claims and their ability to frame them in a way that
takes account of local context and process. Given how significant domestic
ownership is for successful rights recognition, partners in human rights advocacy
must be thoughtful to provide support in ways that do not feed these narrativesand co-opt domestic battles in favor of international ones.

261. See LINos, supra note 49, at 4-5.

